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Since the 1980's, "radical" compositionists concerned 
with the politicization of the writing classroom have made 
use of the work of Jurgen Habermas, whose theories of 
communication within an ideal speech situation--that is, 
the public sphere--have been taken up at different times in 
the field. Composition appropriated Habermasian theory, it 
appears, in order to provide a theoretical background for 
their discussions of consensus and intersubjectivity— 
particularly in collaborative learning--and their 
examination of the social motives that drive dominant 
discourses.
However, there are problems with Habermas. Indeed, his 
attempt to continue the Enlightenment project with his 
focus on Universal Pragmatics does not fit neatly into the 
landscape of postmodern composition studies. Consequently, 
this thesis looks at Habermasian notions of "emancipatory 
discourse" based on "universal structures" through the lens 
of Habermas's "debate" with postmodern philosopher Michel 
Foucault.
Why Foucault? In their efforts to make Habermas "work" 
for composition studies, composition scholars often make 
amendments to their discussions by incorporating what look 
iii
suspiciously like Foucauldian principles. This thesis thus 
sheds light on (1) the extent to which composition has 
fallen short in its efforts to examine Habermasian 
discourse in the public sphere/politicized classroom; and 
(2) whether, through a careful and explicit exploration of 
the Habermas/Foucault debate and the competing concepts of 
discourse contained therein, we might make use of those 
concepts in the politicized classroom to inform student 
writing in the public sphere.
iv
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In Moving Beyond Academic Discourse: Composition 
Studies and the Public Sphere (2002), Christian Weisser 
reveals how,
radical theories in composition studies . . .
have recently begun to conceive of the public 
sphere as ... a useful metaphor for how we 
might envision writing classrooms, (xiii)
By employing the term "radical" in reference to composition 
studies, Weisser refers largely to composition's interest 
-in how ideological beliefs and power shape social, 
cultural, and political attitudes. Weisser goes on to 
demonstrate how these "radical" compositionists are 
interested in writing instruction that has "real political 
and social ramifications" (57); as a result, the writing 
classroom becomes overtly politicized and can be viewed as 
a microcosm of the public sphere.
While discussing "radical composition's" interest in 
the public sphere, Weisser focuses much of his attention to 
the social/critical theorist Jurgen Habermas, whose 
theories of communication in an ideal speech situation— 
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within the public sphere--were taken up by compositionists 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Compositionists appropriated 
Habermasian theory, it appears, in order to provide a 
theoretical background for their discussions of consensus 
and intersubjectivity in collaborative learning, their 
interests in the public sphere, and their examination of 
the social motives that drive dominant discourses.
However, composition's focus on Habermas's 
continuation of the Enlightenment project which attempts to 
find universality in reasoned and consensual communication 
—thus presenting an idealized dialogic space—has proved 
troubling for some. Indeed, in her essay "Paralogy, 
Externalism, and Competence: Exploring Habermas through 
Thomas Kent," Jacqueline Rhodes writes "compositionists 
have grappled (and only sporadically) with [Habermas's] 
ideas without much success" (1). The problem, perhaps, 
stems from the complexity of Habermas's theories, or more 
importantly, from the fact that his attempt to continue the 
Enlightenment project with his focus on Universal 
Pragmatics does not fit neatly into the landscape of 
postmodern composition studies (Rhodes 5).
By introducing Habermasian theory into a principally 
postmodern discipline, compositionists' efforts seem 
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somewhat misguided; for, with his version of the 
Enlightenment project and its potential for universality in 
discourse, Habermas clearly proposes the continuation of 
modernity. Yet, compositionists' discussions of Habermas 
contradictorily hinge on the postmodern idea that discourse 
and knowledge are context-specific and inextricably fused 
with the dynamics of power. In the postmodern view, 
discourse is not objective or indicative of absolute 
"truths"; the nuances of discourse are by no means 
universal. Thus, composition's use of Habermas presents us 
with an interesting inconsistency for Habermas's modernist 
activity sets up criteria of rational discourse that are 
context-transcending (Ashenden and Owen 13). In short, this 
inconsistency presents us with a view of the 
dissimilarities between modern and postmodern theories of 
discourse.
Using Rhodes's assessment of composition's somewhat 
incongruous appropriation of Habermasian theory as a 
springboard, this thesis investigates the work of 
compositionists Patricia Roberts, John Trimbur, and Irene 
Ward, each of whom discuss Habermas's work in terms of the 
potential of his version of emancipatory discourse. In my 
investigation, I explore what I call composition's
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"Habermasian dileinma"--the contradiction implied in 
extending Habermasian, and therefore modernist, approaches 
into a principally postmodern discipline-through the lens 
of his "debate" with postmodern philosopher Michel 
Foucault, who strongly critiqued Habermasian universalism.
Why Foucault? As I see it, in their efforts to make 
Habermas "work" for composition studies, scholars often 
make amendments to their discussions of Habermas by 
incorporating what look suspiciously like Foucauldian 
principles. Foucauldian theory, more often than not, 
complements composition's postmodern leanings for it is 
wholly concerned with the inextricable relationship between 
power, knowledge, and discourse.
What then, can the Habermas/Foucault debate offer 
politicized composition studies? Firstly, this thesis sheds 
light on the extent to which compositionists, perhaps 
unconsciously, amend their examination of Habermasian 
discourse with Foucauldian insight in the public 
sphere/politicized classroom. Accordingly, I suggest that a 
study of the Habermas/Foucault debate foregrounds the sort 
of contradictions I find in composition's use of Habermas; 
indeed, a study of the debate explicitly highlights many of 
the inconsistencies between modern and postmodern theories 
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of discourse which can be openly explored in a politicized 
classroom.
Secondly, bearing the politicized classroom in mind, I 
analyze, through a careful exploration of the 
Habermas/Foucault debate and their competing concepts of 
discourse, how their theories might be used in composition 
studies, as Bernd Stahl puts it, "to complement each other, 
despite their fundamental differences" (4329). Indeed, 
following Bent Flyvbjerg, I show that an explicitly stated, 
"comparative analysis of the central ideas of Habermas and 
Foucault as they pertain to democracy and civil society" 
(210) offers students the opportunity to examine differing ■ 
methods of critique in a politicized classroom; certainly, 
these critiques foreground differing perspectives—and the 
role power plays--on the nature of "truth" and "reason" in 
knowledge and discourse. Students can then utilize these 
critiques to assess their own vantage point when addressing 
social issues of their own choosing.
Finally, I indicate that in order to find a point of 
complementarity between Habermas and Foucault, the idea of 
the idealized speech situation must ultimately be dropped. 
For it is my contention that despite Habermas's efforts to 
prescribe conditions for consensus, the dynamics of power 
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are ever-present. I should add that my attempt to partner 
Habermasian and Foucauldian theory differs from 
composition's previous use of Habermas because it points 
out that composition's amendments to Habermasian theory are 
distinctly Foucauldian, whereas the "Foucault-like" nature 
of my chosen compositionists' "amendments" is merely 
implied.
While their debate was never a formal, public one, 
Habermas and Foucault both addressed communication in terms 
of Enlightenment ideals and responded prolifically to each 
other's work. To illustrate the debate's importance, Scott 
Moore offers the following in his introduction to a recent 
graduate seminar; he states:
At stake is the very nature of Reason, the form 
and substance of Truth, the possibility of 
History, and the perpetuation of Modernity or the 
dawning of a new Postmodern Age. Perhaps the 
issues at stake are best articulated by Foucault 
himself. Responding to a critique by a disciple 
of Habermas, Foucault writes "I think that the 
central issue of philosophy and critical thought 
since the eighteenth century, has been, still is, 
and will, I hope, remain the question, what is
6
this Reason that we use? What are its historical
effects? What are its limits, and what are its 
dangers?" (Par. 2-3)
Like Foucault, "reason" is Habermas's central concern;
certainly, the driving force of his theory of communication 
rests on his notion of rationality, or rather,
"intersubjective agreement" which is "rational, negotiated 
assent among autonomous, responsible individuals" (Grady 
and Wells 1). He looks at how rationality can be 
characterized in universal terms based on the validity 
claims of participants in what he terms an ideal speech 
situation. As Samantha Ashenden and David Owen posit in 
Foucault Contra Habermas, since the 1971 publication of 
Knowledge and Human Interests,
The main thrust of [Habermas's] work has been 
concerned with redeeming the possibility of an 
emancipatory form of knowledge through the 
project of universal pragmatics by rendering 
plausible his theory of communicative action and 
rationality. (3)
I intend to discuss the nature of Universal Pragmatics 
later in this chapter but, for now, I venture that both 
Foucault and Habermas are wholly engaged in the nature of 
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reason/rationality and its effects on emancipatory 
practices in civil democracy. Yet, as I will determine, 
both differ radically in their critiques. Habermasian 
notions of universal ideals in communication, which aim at 
rational consensus between equal and autonomous members of 
a speech situation, lie in stark contrast to what Flyvbjerg 
terms "Foucauldian power analytics" (210). For Foucault, 
discourses of reason are always laced with power because 
power is instrumental in the establishment of knowledge 
within discourse; specifically, power and knowledge are 
inextricable (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 351). Thus, as Ashenden 
and Owen point out, "the crux of Foucauldian criticism is 
skepticism towards the context transcending power of 
critical reflection, its moment of unconditionality" (13) 
because, for Foucault, reason is actually restricted to 
what those in power consider reasonable. Consequently, for 
Foucault, a universal approach to consensus is problematic. 
Flyvbjerg--channeling Foucault--states: "we should operate 
as if universals do not exist. [In fact], where universals 
are said to exist, [they] must be questioned" (222). 
Instead, Foucault posits that domination in public 
discourse must be impaired not by consensual procedures
8
which assume the absence of power but by examinations of 
the exercise of power and rhetoric . (216).
In what seems like a Foucauldian move, "radical 
compositionists," according to Weisser, have "attempted to 
more fully account for the relationship between power and 
discourse" (25). Yet, the compositionists Weisser considers 
have adopted Habermasian theory to inform their pedagogy, 
despite its lack of acknowledgement of the power dynamics 
inherent in discourses. At first glance, Habermasian theory 
seems appropriate to introduce into the field of radical 
composition since his ideas of communicative rationality 
recommend non-coercive consensual debate whereby 
participants attempt to overcome their personal 
subjectivities. In short, participants engage in 
intersubjective and rational debate. Habermas's theory thus 
informs a version of the composition classroom which (a) 
models itself on the Habermasian democratic process and (b) 
gives us an ideal by which to measure our own 
investigations into ideological/political processes. 
However, Foucault might suggest that when aiming for 
consensus through rationalized debate, one must first 
scrutinize what is "rational." One must ask whether the 
participants in a politicized classroom should be guided by 
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abstract systems of theoretical thinking or, perhaps, via 
examinations of resistance and struggle in real, social, 
and historically grounded contexts.
I suggest Foucault offers us an alternative 
conception of communication within the public 
sphere/politicized classroom based on his focus on what 
Flyvbjerg deems realpolitik, and his seemingly (although he 
denied affiliation) postmodern approach to a theory of 
discourse. For, as Flyvbjerg states,
Whereas Habermas approaches regulation [of 
dominance] from a universalistic theory of 
discourse, Foucault seeks out a genealogical 
understanding of actual power relations in 
specific contexts. (223)
It would seem, therefore, that Foucault's approach would 
intrigue radical compositionists' keen interest in the 
politicized classroom, especially with its postmodern 
perception of the classroom/public sphere as a "contested, 
historically textured, multilayered, and sometimes 
contradictory site" (Weisser xiii).
Consequently, with Weisser's (among others) recent 
interfest in the politicization of the writing classroom in 
mind, I suggest the Habermas/Foucault debate has much to 
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offer composition studies. Indeed, as stated earlier, I 
intend to show how Foucault's approach might be used as a 
complement to Habermas in order to provide a theoretical 
background for practical applications in the politicized 
writing classroom. Certainly, a fully articulated 
description of the Habermas/Foucault debate offers students 
an inroad into modernist and postmodernist thought and, 
further, sets the stage for students to scrutinize the 
power relations inherent in the discourses that shape their 
lives.
Before I discuss the implications of this debate for 
radical composition, I attempt to describe the debate more 
fully, keeping in mind its importance to composition 
studies, and the work of the compositionists I single out 
in Chapter Two. I must stress, however, that the length and 
breadth of Foucauldian and Habermasian scholarship is so 
daunting that any approach to it I offer will be tainted by 
my own re-interpretation of the debate which earnestly 
searches for an application to radical composition studies. 
However, it seems, I am in good company. According to Foss, 
Foss, and Trapp in Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, 
Habermas himself has concluded that words, spoken or 
published, "have an effect on readers, and listeners at the 
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moment of their reception which the author cannot revoke or 
withdraw" (237).
The remainder of this chapter provides a brief 
background on the ideas of Habermas and Foucault that 
constitute an overview of the "debate," focusing on the 
fundamental opposition between the two philosophers' ideas 
on language in public contexts. In Chapter Two, I 
investigate the past use of Habermasian theory within 
composition studies, including composition's attempts to 
rehabilitate Habermas through an. unvoiced (or even 
unconscious) reliance on Foucault. Finally, Chapter Three 
explores what use composition might make of a fully 
articulated, deliberate use of the debate between Habermas 
and Foucault—including an attempt to reconcile them—in a 
politicized classroom.
Jurgen Habermas
When asked in a recent interview to pinpoint the 
dominant themes in his life's work, Habermas stated, "I 
suppose Democracy is at least one major issue in my work if 
I look back" (Habermasian Reflections') . Having spent a 
childhood exposed to the horrors of the Nazi regime, 
Habermas explains democracy as "the obvious alternative to 
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the regime under which I had been living" (Reflections). 
Consequently, Habermas describes his ideas on democracy as 
the "thread running through my work at the beginning to 
what I am presently interested in" (Reflections).
Habermasian theories of democracy extend from a 
diverse array of philosophical, social, and political 
thought. Yet, to fully understand them, one must be 
familiar with the theories of those who have influenced his 
ideas. Becoming familiar with Habermas's reading list, 
however, is no mean feat. In the "The Technical, the 
Practical, and the Emancipatory: A Habermasian View of 
Composition Pedagogy," John Aber writes:
Part of the difficulty may lie in the breadth of 
Habermas's scholarship. His densely written books 
are stuffed with an encyclopedic range of 
references and illusions. Many of us who studied 
rhetoric and composition in graduate schools are 
simply not conversant with the nineteenth century 
German philosophical tradition that underpins 
Habermas's work. (124)
Habermas's influences do not only entail a vast knowledge 
of German philosophy. Besides the philosophies of Kant, (in 
particular), Schelling, and others, Habermasian theory 
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grounds itself in the intellectual theories of The 
Frankfurt School.
As one of the central surviving theorists to emerge 
from the Frankfurt Institute—known for its focus on social 
philosophy--Habermas draws much from Critical Theory. 
Critical Theory concerns itself' with the idea, as Foss, 
Foss, and Trapp put it, that "society can be experienced as 
an arrangement of ideas that invite rational critique," 
(246), and expounds three fundamental tenets. Firstly, for 
emancipation from domination and ideology, society must 
move in a rational direction. We must remember, however, 
that as rationality is progressive, we must be aware of the 
contradictions inherent in it. That is, we must have the 
ability to see irrationality. For instance, societal 
participants must be aware of technical rationality which 
often comes at the expense of human concerns (246). 
Secondly, calling for "the marriage of theory and 
practice," Critical Theorists attempt to relate their 
theories to current social concerns. Events in contemporary 
society inform Critical Theory, as Critical Theory so too 
attempts to inform societal consciousness (247) . Finally, 
Critical Theory strives to critique the belief systems that 
shape ideology (247). Critical Theory defines ideology as a 
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"system of irrational beliefs that maintain legitimacy 
despite the fact that it cannot be validated if subjected 
to rational discourse" (247). From examining briefly these 
three tenets we will later see how Critical Theory features 
largely in Habermas's theory of communication, which aims 
to keep a watchful eye on conditions of domination.
In addition to German philosophy and The Frankfurt
School, Habermas is also influenced by Marxism. This is not 
surprising since, as Foss, Foss, and Trapp point out, 
Marxism "was central to the Frankfurt School at the time 
Habermas studied there" (237). However, Habermas offers a 
"'reconstruction of Marxism', by which he means 'taking a 
theory apart and putting it back together'" (237). Eung-Jun 
Min claims that this theoretical reconstruction strategy 
becomes manifest in Habermas's "reformulation of historical 
materialism" which features "greater emphasis on 
communication and culture" (1). Traditionally, historical 
materialism focuses on societal development and change via 
the analysis of its economic production. However, Min 
states that Habermas's reformulation is important because 
it "emphasizes social conditions affecting the legitimacy 
of various cultural forms," (1) in particular, in the way 
we communicate. Habermas's interest in human communication 
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is crucial because, as Nancy Love writes, "it is social 
interaction that is our distinctively human capacity" (49). 
Furthermore, underlying our ability to interact are certain 
intersubjective norms that facilitate our interactions 
(49); It is the recognition of rules and norms in human 
communication that was to become the basis for Habermas's 
communicative theory.
It should be no surprise, therefore, to discover that 
Habermas was also influenced largely by the Speech Act 
Theory of J. L. Austin and John Searle. In his 1965 article 
"What is a Speech Act?" Searle states that the production 
of the sentence under certain conditions constitutes an 
illocutionary act and these are necessarily rule governed. 
In his discussion of "Rules," Searle later states:
In recent years, there has been in the philosophy 
of language considerable discussion involving the 
notion of rules for the use of expressions . . .
one disquieting feature of such discussions is 
that no such philosopher, to my knowledge at 
least, has ever anything like an adequate 
formulation of the rules for the use of even one 
expression. (255)
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Following the work of Austin and Searle, it is clear that 
Habermas takes up this gauntlet. Furthermore, by laying out 
a complex theory of the rules that govern communicative 
acts, Habermas makes a case for the continuation of 
modernity.
Habermas's Modernism; Reason in the Public Sphere
In the article "Jurgen Habermas: Theologian of Talk," 
which discusses Habermas's relationship to modernity, 
Stephen Mitchell writes "The question is whether Justice 
exists and Reason can benefit society. It's postmodern to 
say no, but Jurgen Habermas disagrees" (par. 1). Min, 
echoing Mitchell, states:
Postmodernism is becoming the dominant and 
political form of our epoch with systematic 
excesses and provocations. But not everyone 
rejects the modernist project. Most famously, 
Habermas has called for the completion of the 
project of modernity, a project whose roots lie 
in the Enlightenment notion of rationality. (11) 
In his re-imagining of Enlightenment rationality, Habermas 
claims to find the genesis of a theoretical approach which 
aims to smooth out the social imbalances in contemporary 
society (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 238). The Enlightenment's 
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significance to Habermas lies in his belief that "it gave 
birth to a particular conception of reason in the public 
sphere (238); he would thus salvage this version of reason 
to construct his own theory of communication. Simply put, 
the Enlightenment public sphere offered a place where 
individuals from the private realm could get together in 
the public realm (coffee houses, salons, and publishing 
houses) to form public opinion which was not subject to 
political, that is, monarchal, authority (239).
Habermas claims his idea of reasoned debate in the 
public sphere differs somewhat from the positivistic 
rationality of the Enlightenment; that is, the idea that 
the only valid knowledge is that which is "empirically 
testable," "value free," and "disinterested" (Grady and 
Wells 34). For Habermas, debate in the sphere rests on his 
version of what is rational:
We call someone rational not only if he is able 
to put forward an assertion and, when criticized, 
to provide grounds for it by pointing to the 
appropriate evidence, but also if he is following 
an established norm and is able, when criticized, 
to justify his action by explicating the 
situation in light of legitimate expectations.
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We even call someone rational if he makes known a
desire or an intention . . . and is then able to
reassure critics in regard to the revealed 
experience by drawing practical consequences from 
it and behaving consistently thereafter, (qtd. in 
Ashenden and Owen 4)
Understanding Habermas's vision of rationality in the 
public sphere in twentieth and twenty-first century terms 
is crucial because, as Foss, Foss, and Trapp put it, his 
vision guarantees "every citizen the right of access to 
discussion in the public sphere by virtue of the abstract 
right of humanness" (239). In the public sphere, individual 
freedom is essential to the process of consensus. Habermas 
says:
The degree of legal equality should be achieved 
which will allow at the same time the greatest 
possible measure of individualism, and this means 
for individuals to shape their own lives . . .
Freedom . . . can only be thought in connection
with a network of interpersonal relationships, 
and this means in the context of the 
communicative structures of a community, which 
ensures that the freedom of some is not achieved 
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at the cost of the freedom of others, (qtd. in 
Foss, Foss, and Trap 233)
Thus, Habermas insists that reasoned communication within 
the public sphere does not allow for coercion or domination 
of others, thus, individual subjects reach consensus in the 
public sphere intersubjectively. Habermasian 
intersubjectivity is typified by participants engaging in 
communicative practices that emphasize "shared knowledge, 
mutual trust, and accord with one another" (Habermas qtd. 
in Roberts, par. 20).
While critics have labeled these ideas utopian, 
Habermas insists his notion of intersubjectivity has become 
unrealistic because of human dependence on material systems 
and structures (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 243). For example, 
because of what he terms "colonization," Habermas posits 
that humankind has less need to achieve consensus through 
communication because disputes can be resolved by adhering 
to sets of formal laws and regulations put in place by 
those in power (244). By relying on these structures, 
personal autonomy becomes subordinate to the rules and 
regulations which attempt to create efficient systems yet 
actually decrease the potential of consensus—through 
intersubjective agreement—in what Habermas calls "The
20
Lifeworld"; that is, the "immediate milieu of the social 
actor" (242) .
Despite humankind's inability to divorce itself from 
systems that undermine the potential of consensual 
communication, Habermas insists that public debate is 
crucial for democracy. He further claims that the perfect 
conditions for equal, rational debate are possible in what 
he terms the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech 
situation rests on Habermas's assertion that "conditions of 
rational argumentation [can] operate critically as a 
regulative ideal immanent in all speech act offers," 
(Ashenden and Owen 5). Here Habermas makes his most 
controversial claim. He insists that despite our capacity 
to recognize the presuppositions of context-bound speech 
acts, "the validity of these presuppositions is not context 
bound" (5). Consequently, he claims "The transcendental 
moment of universal validity bursts every provinciality 
asunder" (qtd. in Ashenden and Owen 5). In the following 
section, I will explain what Habermas means by the validity 
of speech acts via what he terms "Universal Pragmatics." 
The Ideal Speech Situation: Universal Pragmatics
Habermas attempts his continuation of modernity by 
looking at the way humans use language. As he reveals to 
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Mitchell, "in our everyday knowledge of how language is 
properly used, we find a common ground among all creatures 
with a human face" (par. 32). Following Austin and Searle's 
Speech Act Theory, Habermas claims to satisfy modernity's 
quest for universalism by finding common ground in language 
structures. Thus, emancipatory discourse might develop from 
Habermas's ideas of language being "properly used" 
(Mitchell, par. 32).
If, in Habermasian terms, the public sphere offers a 
place where one might achieve the ideal speech situation, 
then this situation must be a place where participants 
attempt communicative competence by following certain rules 
during an interaction; Habermas calls these rules 
"Universal Pragmatics." In Addressing Postmodernity, 
Barbara Biesecker addresses the implications of Universal 
Pragmatics. She states that following Speech Act Theory and 
taking an utterance or statement as the basic unit of 
speech for analysis (rather than the sentence), Habermas 
asserts that a set of relations become functional during an 
act of communication:
The first relation is between that which is 
stated and an extra linguistic reality of 
phenomena to which the statement refers; the
22
second is between that which is stated and the 
speakers own intentional experiences; and the 
third is between that which is stated and the 
intersubjectively established values and norms 
that.constitute the shared lifeworld. (78)
In short, embedded within the framework of these relations 
is a specific goal-directed process aimed at mutual 
understanding. Indeed, within human communication, Habermas 
claims, in Theory and Practice, "the telos of reaching an 
understanding is already inherent" (17). Of course, 
communication is always open for distortion; for instance, 
a speaker might not always speak truthfully, s/he might not 
always be forthright, and so on. However, as Habermas 
reveals in Communication and the Evolution of Society, in a 
successful act of communication, competent communicators 
adhere to the above stated set of relations in the 
following ways:
1. by using the propositional sentence that will 
fulfill the presuppositions of both addressor 
and addressee.
2. by expressing intent in a way that it is 
understood by both addressor and addressee 
(according to the second relation).
23
3. by configuring the expression so it conforms to 
the discursive expectations of the 
addressor/addressee's shared identification, 
(qtd. in Rhodes 4)
These rules of communicative competence constitute 
Habermas's validity claims. Validity claims are redeemable 
and indicate an interlocutor's ability to communicate in a 
specific way aimed at "a shared understanding of truth, 
rightness, and sincerity" (3).
In an act of communication, then, advancing these 
claims will assist the speaker in communicating in a way 
that, as Hugh H. Grady and Susan Wells put it, is "socially 
situated, open to reflection, and that refuses to value one 
form of discourse--scientific, persuasive, or expressive— 
at the expense of others" (36). In short, Habermas's vision 
of communicative competence, or rather his discourse 
ethics, posits conditions for discourse from which 
interlocutors can recognize universally valid norms. Most 
importantly, these conditions ensure that the interests of 
all participants are met (Cavalier and Ess, par. 16).
As Grady and Wells indicate, Habermas's ideal speech 
situation is not characteristic of human communication. 
Certainly, he recognizes that validity claims do not 
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necessarily constitute the normal characteristics of day to 
day communication (36). Indeed, we have all experienced 
such speech situations whereby the best interests of all 
the participants are not taken into account. However, Grady 
and Wells indicate Habermas's explicit instruction that 
validity claims "are logically necessary qualities of 
speech directed at understanding" (36). Thus, to further 
understanding and to enable rational consensus, validity 
claims implicit in communication must be redeemable. That 
is, validity claims must be "supportable by rational 
argumentation, open to questioning of assumption, addressed 
by speakers free from inequality, coercion, and domination" 
(36). Certainly, in an ideal speech situation, a 
participant's rationality can be challenged if it appears 
to be deceptive or forcefully imposing an opinion at the 
expense of silencing of others (36).
It is vital to remember for this project, as Maeve 
Cook states, that communicative competence "makes us aware 
that as speakers and hearers, there are certain things we 
must—as a matter of necessity--always already have 
presupposed if communication is to be successful" (3). For 
Habermas, these presuppositions can constitute "universal 
competencies" inherent in the day to day linguistic 
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practices of communicators engaged in the effort of mutual 
understanding (3). It is important to note that Habermas 
claims his project is context dependent; that is, "what is 
right and true in given communicative process is determined 
solely by the participants in that process" (Flyvbjerg 
214). Nevertheless, he maintains that the universal 
structures implied by universal pragmatics do underlie his 
idea of rational communication, and with this theory, he 
projects the continuation of modernity. However, even by 
positing universal rules in a context dependent speech 
situation, Habermas neglects one very important factor: the 
issue of power. Consequently, as Flyvbjerg announces "Here 
we turn to the work of Michel Foucault" (219) .
Michel Foucault
Unlike Habermas, Foucault seems extremely wary of a 
universalizing theory that transcends contextual 
boundaries. As I have indicated, Habermas insists upon a 
universalizing theory of discourse which holds up the 
yardstick against which we might measure ethical normative 
standards based on his notion of the ideal speech situation 
(and the inherent-ness of presuppositions in the advancing 
of validity claims.) Alternatively, Foucault indicates that 
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we need to study the contextual elements of language from a 
historical viewpoint in order to unearth the power 
relations in discourses. That is, we should scrutinize 
normative standards from a historical perspective because 
the projection of normative standards according to a 
universalizing theory can result in the privileging of one 
discourse over another.
Paul Rainbow highlights Foucault's suspicion of 
universal truths in his introduction to The Foucault 
Reader, claiming "He doesn't refute them; instead his 
consistent response is to historicize grand abstractions" 
(4). Therefore, Foucault rejects the notion of a 
transcendental "beyond"—that is, the assertion of an 
inherent moral ethic in human speech--because, for 
Foucault, this morality is a consequence of arbitrary, 
historical conditions and power struggles. As a result, he 
questions the ethical standards Habermas proposes, despite 
Habermas's efforts to sustain a theory of discourse that 
cannot be exploited (Flyvbjerg 215).
Foucault's critique—which rests on the notion that 
human values and beliefs emerge out of historical, social, 
and political "accidents" rather than a historical 
progression towards an ideal societal vision—takes what he 
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terms first an "archeological" approach (The Birth of the 
Clinic [1963], The Order of things [1966], The Archeology 
of Knowledge [1968]) and later, following Nietzsche, a 
"genealogical" approach (Discipline and Punish [1975]). 
According to Gary Cutting in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy,
The premise of the archaeological method is that 
systems of thought and knowledge (epistemes or 
discursive formations, in Foucault's terminology) 
are governed by rules, beyond those of grammar 
and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness 
of individual subjects and define a system of 
conceptual possibilities that determines the 
boundaries of thought in a given domain and 
period, (par. 11)
The force of archaeology's criticism lies in the comparison 
of different systems of thought during different historical 
periods. Foucault reveals the contingency of the "truths" 
of those systems. He claims these "truths" are random and 
accidental, not conveyers of preexisting meaning (Bizzell 
and Herzberg 1432). In fact, in "The Order of Discourse," 
Foucault remarks that "the tendency of Western philosophy 
has been the desire to locate truth in something other than 
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the discourse itself" (1432). He calls this the Will to 
Truth. Foucault points out the Will to Truth by showing 
that previous ages had systems of thought very different to 
others. He uses Greek history as an example:
There is no doubt that the division is 
historically constituted. For the Greek poets of 
the sixth century BC, the true discourse . . .
the discourse which inspired respect and terror 
. . . the discourse which in prophesying the
future not only announced what was going to 
happen but helped make it happen, carrying men's 
minds along with it and thus weaving it into the 
fabric of destiny. Yet already a century later 
the highest truth no longer resided in what 
discourse was or did . . . the true discourse is
no longer precious and desirable, since it is no 
longer linked to the exercise of power. (1462)
The exercise of power, for Foucault, drives The Will to 
Truth; indeed, according to Foss, Foss, and Trapp, Foucault 
became interested in the effects of power on discourse when 
"he came to realize that the treatment of knowledge within 
discourse can not be separated from the operation of power" 
(351). However, the archeological method, while effective 
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in showing that notions of Truth are always dependent on a 
particular system of thought and therefore indicative of 
systems of power, says little about the transition process 
from one system to another, or rather, how systems of 
thought are generated. Consequently, Foucault, inspired by 
Nietzsche, employed the genealogical method which surfaces 
in Discipline and Punish.
On discovering Nietzsche, Foucault says "Nietzsche was 
a revelation to me. I felt there was something quite 
different from what I had been taught" (qtd. in Foss, Foss, 
and Trapp 341). Following Nietzsche,
Foucault intended the term "genealogy" to evoke
Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals, particularly 
with its suggestion of complex, mundane, 
inglorious origins—in no way part of any grand 
scheme of progressive history. The point of a 
genealogical analysis is to show that a given 
system of thought (itself uncovered in its 
essential structures by archaeology, which 
therefore remains part of Foucault's 
historiography) was the result of contingent 
turns of history, not the outcome of rationally 
inevitable trends. (Cutting, par. 13)
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When asking how knowledge (and the power structures which 
support it) is made possible—or rather "How does it happen 
at a given period something could be said and something 
else has never been said" (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 347)— 
Foucault's genealogical method rejects the search for 
origins of thought which indicate ideal or glorious 
beginnings (much like Plato's return to the place of ideal 
forms). In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Foucault 
restates Nietzsche's assertion that "genealogy . . .
rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal 
significations and indefinite teleologies" (77). Why? 
Foucault answers:
Because it is an attempt to capture the exact 
essence of things in their purest possibilities, 
and their carefully protected identities . . .
because this search assumes the existence of 
immobile forms that precede the external world of 
accident and succession. (78)
For Nietzsche, and Foucault, there are no ideal beginnings, 
for, via the referral to ideal beginnings, systems of 
thought are able to dictate who speaks and what can or 
cannot be said. Instead of the search for origins of 
thought as they progress through a glorious teleological 
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view of history, genealogy's task reveals a messy, 
fragmented view as it aims to identify,
the accidents, the minute deviations--or 
conversely the complete reversals--the errors, 
the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations 
that gave birth to all those things that continue 
to exist and have value for us; it is to discover 
that truth and being does not lie at the root of 
what we know and what we are, but the exteriority 
of accidents. (81)
In short, systems of thought are often contingent upon 
and/or are a result of historical mishaps and sites of 
conflict.
To recognize the contingency of systems of thought in 
history, Foucault suggests a re-realization of history by 
way of, what Nietzsche terms, Effective History. Effective 
History is a historical standpoint which rejects "the dull 
constancy of instinctual life" (Foucault 86)—instinctual 
in the sense that we have learned habits, values, and 
ideals rather than received them from some metaphysical 
source. Effective history should impose its genealogical 
gaze upon what Foucault terms, "the universe of rules" and 
record "the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical 
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concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or the 
ascetic life" (Foucault 86). A historical sense which 
overthrows the universe of rules put in place by the 
millennial play of systems of domination can evade the 
metaphysical heights humankind habitually strives for and 
refuse what Foucault deems "the certainty of absolutes" 
(87). Consequently, an "effective" historical sense might 
reveal discourses that might have otherwise remained mute. 
Foucault and Reason
Bearing in mind Foucault's reluctance to idealize the 
origins of systems of thought, we can now explore his 
scrutiny of reason. Firstly, we should recall Habermas's 
point of view that reason, or "what is rational," has 
particular characteristics; for instance, an assertion must 
adhere to "established norms" and when criticized, point to 
"appropriate evidence ... in the light of legitimate 
expectations" (qtd. in Ashenden and Owen 4). I will compare 
this view—which has its "roots" in the Enlightenment's 
version of Reason—with that of Foucault's. Taking into 
consideration that Habermasian attempts to rescue modernity 
stem from a re-articulation of the Enlightenment, Foucault 
reminds us in "What'is Enlightenment" that the 
Enlightenment should be scrutinized as an historical event 
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rather than a formula for how society "should" think. He 
reminds us that the Enlightenment emerged from a "complex 
historical process that is located at a certain point in 
the development of European societies" (43). Therefore, 
even Enlightenment Reason should not escape genealogy's 
scrutiny which, according to Foucault in "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History," unsurprisingly unearths its messy 
beginnings:
Examining the history of reason, [the 
genealogist] learns that it was born in an 
altogether "reasonable" fashion—from chance; 
devotion to truth and the precision of scientific 
methods arose from the passion of scholars, their 
reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending 
discussions, and their spirit of competition—the 
personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons 
of reason. (78)
If, therefore, Foucault's notion that Enlightenment reason 
emerges from passions, conflict, and competition, 
Habermas's attempts to hypothesize established norms 
(loosely based on a version of Enlightenment Reason), which 
themselves seem to suggest that they are beyond human 
"passions," and which ultimately seek to free societies 
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from coercion, might arouse Foucauldian suspicion. This is 
not to say Foucault rejects reason; according to Flyvbjerg, 
Foucault agrees that in politics one must "side with 
reason" ("Ideal Theory" 8). However, Flyvbjerg reiterates 
Foucault words of caution in L' impossible Prison "that to 
respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a 
blackmail to prevent an analysis of the rationalities 
really at work" (8). Foucault might, therefore, suggest 
Habermas's "reasonable" norms are products of a contingent 
notion of "truth" put in place by those in power. 
Consequently, in contrast to Habermas's approach, genealogy 
cannot authenticate these norms into absolutes--that is, 
constitutional standards that anticipate and dictate human 
behaviour—but instead, as Foucault tells us in "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, and History," it "seeks to reestablish the 
various systems of subjection" (83). That is, genealogy 
seeks to uncover what is left out while societal norms are 
constructed.
Yet, as David Couzens Hoy articulates in Critical 
Theory, genealogy does not look for any definitive 
definitions about what is rational and what is not. Hoy 
highlights Foucault's reluctance to be "for" or "against" a 
traditional conception of reason citing Foucault's 
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accusation that this point of view is "blackmail because it 
seems to a make a 'rational critique of rationality' 
impossible" (146). He states:
In contrast to Habermas, Foucault does not think 
that to undertake a rational critique of 
rationality one must construct a theory of what 
rationality really is as the counterpoint to the 
conception that took itself as rational but that 
it is shown by critical investigation to be 
veiling deep irrationality. For Foucault, Reason 
is "self creating." (146)
Hoy points out that the bottom line is not to argue about 
what or what is not rational; instead, a genealogy attempts 
to show that "because forms of rationality have been made, 
they can be unmade . . . rationality is not an abstract 
theory but enmeshed in the background web of concrete 
practices" (148). In short, rationality is a human 
practice which is subject to the same errors, emotions, 
conflicts, and accidents that face all humans during their 
moment of historical difference.
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Foucault and Contemporary Society
Ashenden1 and Owen highlight two problematics which 
articulate Foucault's critical approach, both 
archeologically and genealogically:
1. How do human beings govern themselves and 
others by the production of truth?
2. How can the growth of capabilities [in modern 
society] be disconnected from the 
intensification of power relations? (9)
Once again, Foucault does not aim to discover a unifying 
and universal theory of truth which might be applied to a 
politicized speech situation; instead, he wants to uncover 
the politics underlying what is "True" or what, as he 
states in "Truth and Power," "induces regular effects of 
power" (73). He continues:
Each society has its regime of truth, its general 
politics of truth: that is the types of 
discourses which it accepts and makes function as 
true; the mechanisms and instances which enable 
one to distinguish true and false statements, the 
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques 
and procedures accorded value in the acquisition 
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of truth; the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true. (73)
In a sense Foucault does recognize societal norms as 
legitimate but their authority is contingent on a 
particular society's recognition of truth. Thus, in 
addressing the first problematic, we might hazard a guess 
that societies govern themselves based on the contingent 
notion of what is valid and accepted within the political 
framework of that particular society.
To attend to the second problematic, Flyvbjerg ("Ideal 
Theory, Real Rationality: Habermas versus Foucault and 
Nietzsche") proposes that Foucault's critique suggests its 
own normative standards; however, his standards don't 
impose meaning on societies, rather, Foucauldian "norms" 
challenge "every abuse of power whoever the author, whoever 
the victims" (Flyvbjerg 9). Thus, a genealogical critique 
might facilitate the disconnection between growth of 
capabilities in modern society and the intensification of 
power relations. Consequently, any form of government, be 
it totalitarian or pluralistic, should be subject to 
"analysis and critique based on [its citizens] will not to 
be dominated [and] the ability to voice concerns in public" 
(9). However, according to Flyvbjerg, Foucauldian norms 
38
cannot be given universal grounding because "they are based 
on a personal and historical context" (9). Such a grounding 
would be objectionable since it would give rise to 
"utopian/totalitarian implications that Foucault would warn 
against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or 
Habermas" (9). For Foucault, at no other time in history 
has more suffering been produced than by societies who 
propound "strong commitments to implementing utopian 
visions of the good" (9).
Conclusion
While the Habermas/Foucault debate on the 
characteristics and possibilities of discourse in civil 
society extends far beyond my discussion here, I hope I 
have forwarded an introductory overview which will offer a 
framework through which I can revisit composition's use of 
Habermas. To summarize this overview therefore, I turn to 
Bernd Stahl who states:
Briefly, Foucault stands for the investigation of 
power ... on historical discourses whereas 
Habermas stands for a normative explication of 
the validity and acceptability of discourses. 
Foucault can be read as an attack on the 
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universalistic idea of rationality whereas 
Habermas tries to uphold the power of reason and 
the validity of norms despite the end of grand 
narratives. (4331)
As for Habermas's criticism of Foucault, Flyvbjerg 
clarifies that it rests on his complaint that Foucault 
cannot give "an account of the normative foundations for 
his thinking" (220) . Furthermore, Habermas accuses Foucault 
of being relativistic and crypto-normative (220). As for 
Habermas, "he has not, so far, been able to demonstrate 
that rational and universal grounding of his discourse 
ethics is possible, he has only postulated such grounding" 
(220). In short, Habermas hypothesizes rules which ensure 
equal participation in democracy, but have yet to be 
demonstrated; whereas Foucault, "shows restraint in matters 
of commitments to ideas and systems of thought about what 
is good for man" (222) based on his insistence that power 
struggles dominate human history rather than the adherence 
to abstract ideals.
So, what can the Habermas/Foucault debate offer 
composition studies? It is my contention that it can inform 
students in■a politicized classroom about the limits of 
universal theories of "reasonable" discourse and the power
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dynamics inherent in those discourses; in view of this, I 
address this assertion in more detail in Chapter Three. 
Firstly, however, and bearing in mind the postmodern and 
politicized landscape within which composition is often 
situated, my next chapter will locate Habermasian theory in 
articles by Patricia Roberts, John Trimbur, and Irene Ward. 
In doing so, I will show how these compositionists, perhaps 
unconsciously due to the influence of postmodernism on 
composition studies, seem to amend Habermas's work by 
turning to a Foucauldian method of critique. For my 
purposes, scrutinizing these amendments serves to highlight 
the dissimilarities between Habermasian and Foucauldian 
theories of discourse which will, in turn, explicitly 




HABERMASIAN APPROACHES IN 
COMPOSITION STUDIES
According to Jacqueline Rhodes, Habermas's very
"modern" attempt to continue the Enlightenment project, 
with his focus on Universal Pragmatics, "does not fit 
neatly into the landscape of postmodern composition 
studies" (5). Consequently, the compositionists who look to 
Habermas to inform their theories of writing try to make 
him "fit" into their work by weaving in postmodern and, as 
I will suggest, Foucauldian perspectives. The purpose of 
this chapter, therefore, is twofold: firstly, I will 
discuss the commanding influence of postmodernism in 
composition and identify postmodern (and Foucauldian) 
tendencies in the field by way of Dragon Milovanovic's 
investigation, "Dueling Paradigms: Modernist v.
Postmodernist Thought." Secondly, I will discuss the work 
of three compositionists, Patricia Roberts, John Trimbur, 
and Irene Ward, each of whom use Habermasian theory to 
enrich their discussions of writing in the collaborative 
classroom, and, in Ward's case, to study the implications 
of envisioning the Internet as a democratic public sphere.
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I will show that, in all three cases, these writers reveal 
their postmodern leanings when they amend their use of 
Habermas with Foucauldian perspectives. These perspectives 
emerge in compositionists' discussions of difference, 
dissensus, and the power relations inherent in discourses. 
This indicates composition's endeavor to ground itself in 
postmodern thought; hence, Habermas's modern leanings— 
which come across in his adherence to an ideal speech 




In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve 
Lectures, Habermas dedicates two chapters to a critique of 
Foucault who, according to James Schmidt, "[has] followed 
Nietzsche in regarding Modernity as utterly beyond 
redemption" (315). While Foucault has rejected affiliation 
with "movements," he is, more often than not, labeled a 
postmodernist. For instance, in "Dueling Paradigms: 
Modernity v. Post Modernist Thought," Milovanovic claims: 
Post modernist analysis had its roots in French 
thought, particularly during the late 1960s and
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early 1970s. Here, with the continued 
disillusionment with conventional critical 
thought, a transition from Hegelian to 
Nietzschean thought took place. Deleuze, 
Guttari, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and 
Foucault . . . were to emerge bearing the banner
of postmodern thinking (par. 4).
Like Milovanovic, Gary Aylesworth also attests to
Foucault's postmodern leanings, claiming that his
"application of genealogy to formative moments in 
modernity's history" places him firmly "within the scope of 
postmodern discourse" (par. 24).
Firstly then, before I address Roberts, Trimbur, and 
Ward, I'd like to discuss the effects of postmodernism on 
composition and how we can locate Foucauldian principles 
within postmodern composition studies.
Postmodernism and the Writer
Composition has clearly assumed a postmodern 
perspective in the last two decades. In The Bedford 
Bibliography: History of Rhetoric and Composition, Nedra 
Reynolds, Bruce Herzberg, and Patricia Bizzell state that 
the,
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powerful themes (in comp studies) of the 1980's 
[were] social construction, politics, literacy, 
and gender issues . . . [which] extended into the
nineties to work that related composition to 
postmodern and cultural studies. (9)
Many books and articles have focused on postmodern trends 
which are intricately connected with social constructivist 
theories. For instance, in "Porno Blues: Stories from First 
Year Composition," Lee Ann Carroll cites postmodernity's 
influence on such composition giants as Lester Faigley 
(Fragments of Rationality: Post Modernity and the Subject 
of Composition), Patricia Harkin and John Schilb 
(Contending with Words: Composition in the Postmodern Age), 
and Susan Miller (Textual Carnivals) (916). Faigley, 
according to Carroll, claims that composition has "come to 
accept a postmodern view of knowledge and discourse of all 
kinds as socially and politically constructed" (917).
Accordingly, Carroll emphasizes Faigley's point of view and 
demonstrates the postmodern influence on writing studies in 
five key areas. These "five key postmodernist ideas"--which 
shape the production of writing--state:
(1) "The stories we tell are the stories that are 
culturally available to us" (920).
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(2) "The conventions and details of many of the 
stories we tell are in a sense, already written 
and read by the culture" (922).
(3) "The stories we can tell are constrained by the 
context in which we tell them, with much left out 
or suppressed" (923).
(4) "Non-narrative forms are often closely related to 
suppressed personal narratives" (927).
(5) "All texts are interested—none are inherently 
"Normal" or "Neutral" (928).
In citing these concepts, Carroll takes up the postmodern 
point of view that dispenses with traditional and modernist 
views of the lone writer. Furthermore, she indicates the 
non-neutral characteristics of discourse.
To clarify the postmodern position, Milovanovic 
explains that "modernist thought has privileged the idea of 
the individual as a person who is assumed to be conscious, 
whole, self-directing, reflective and unitary" (par. 24). 
However, as Carroll's concepts indicate, the writer as a 
self-constructing individual is no longer accepted by the 
postmodern paradigm. Milovanovic elaborates that the 
postmodern subject "is more determined than determining, is 
less unified . . . caught within the constraints of 
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competing discourses and their structuring properties" 
(par. 25). By "structuring properties," Milovanovic refers 
to the subject's socio-cultural experience. Thus, the 
writer can only write what is experientially available 
according to her/his socio-cultural history.
The most important aspect of Carroll's work, for my 
discussion here, is that in the postmodern paradigm, 
knowledge and discourse echo contingent and provisional 
versions of truth which, as we might surmise from above, 
are culturally bound. In short, cultural ideas are 
conditional on (to use a Foucauldian expression) a specific 
"discursive formation," that is, a system of thought. Thus, 
when Carroll states that the stories written by her 
students are already "culturally available to us," and 
"written and read by the culture," she indicates that they 
are informed by cultural practices that are, as Milovanovic 
reinforces, anything but neutral. He states that for 
postmodernists there are,
many discourses reflective of local sites of 
production, each in turn, existing with a , 
potential for the embodiment of desire in 
signifiers and for .the construction of realities, 
(par. 34)
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This "desire" relates to whose "realities" are constructed
and maintained as the dominant norm. From a postmodern 
perspective, we can assume that these realities reflect 
dominant and powerful discourses; consequently, a 
postmodernist outlook indicates that we can expect, as 
Carroll iterates, that "much is suppressed" during the 
construction of these realities.
Thus, Carroll's fifth concept "all texts are 
interested--none are inherently 'Normal. . .'" indicates
the postmodern, and Foucauldian, outlook that knowledge and 
power are inextricably interwoven. Knowledge and ideology 
are consequences of the dominant discourse which is, 
generally, perceived as the most relevant, and since, as 
Milovanovic states, "subjects must situate themselves in 
it, they are subject to its interpellative effects" (par.
42). In short, no text is value-free. Every text reproduces 
ideological "norms" in one way or another, and we can thus 
assume, as Foucault shows us, that these norms reflect the 
interests of those in power. In Carroll's case, this plays 
out as her students write for-those-in-authority (with all 
the power relations that implies); thus, students' 
production is informed by the demands of the academy.
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Postmodernism and "Radical" Composition
James Berlin offers more examples of the substantial 
effects of postmodernism on composition studies. In "Post 
structuralism, Cultural Studies and the Composition 
Classroom: Postmodern Theory in Practice," he maintains,
It is clear to me that rhetoric and composition 
studies has arrived as a serious field of study 
because it has taken into account the best that 
has been thought about and said about its 
concerns from the past and present, and I have 
found that postmodern work in historical and 
contemporary rhetorical theory has done much to 
further this effort. (16)
As far as, what Weisser terms, "radical" composition is 
concerned, the importance of postmodernism lies in the fact 
that it has informed "one of the most distinguishing 
features of the radical compositionist' s approach [which 
is] its emphasis on ideology" (Weisser 27).
Milovanovic tackles the issue of how ideology surfaces 
in systems of thought in his discussions of "society and 
social structure" (3). For modernists, the search for over­
encompassing theories of society typifies modernist 
thought—such as Habermas's theory of communicative action, 
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which we might assume to be a foundational, or rather, 
constitutional approach to societal theory. Contrarily, as 
Milovanovic states, postmodernism dictates "that the search 
for an overall, all-encompassing totalizing theory [of 
society] is an illusory exercise" (par. 13). Milovanovic 
further claims that for postmodernism, "no possibility 
exists for precisely specifying initial conditions" of a 
stable order in society (par. 13). That is, postmodernism 
rejects foundationalist ideological principles. This view 
corresponds with Foucault's assertion that there are no 
"ideal" beginnings in societal structure, for, when 
individuals or governments refer to ideal beginnings, 
systems of thought dictate who speaks and what can or 
cannot be said. Following this, we might assume that the 
voices that are heard reflect dominant ideologies.
Postmodernism thus views the emergence of ideological 
paradigms as the result of conflict rather than adherence 
to ideals. As noted in Chapter One, this notion corresponds 
to Foucauldian theory. To illustrate this concept of 
ideology further, Weisser cites Berlin's discussion of 
discourse and the ideological burdens it carries in 
Rhetoric and Ideology; Weisser states,
50
Radical compositionists see discourse as deeply 
implicated with dominant ideology, and they see 
ideology as transmitted through language 
practices that are always at the center of 
conflicts and contest. (27)
In "Post structuralism ..." Berlin elaborates, stating 
that the postmodern subject "is considered a construction 
of varying signifying practices, the uses of language, of a 
given historical moment" (18). These "signifying practices" 
are discourses that identify us and tell us "how we should 
behave in terms of such categories as gender, race, class, 
ethnicity and the like" (18). To emphasize, Berlin cites 
(among others) Foucault's "discursive formations." These 
formations amount to, "elaborate systems of signifying 
systems [which] form power/knowledge formations that govern 
action during successive stages in history" (19). We can 
assume, therefore, that these power/knowledge formations 
shape discourses which uphold the signifying practices of 
dominant discourse.
From an idealist perspective, it would appear that 
since the subjects within a discursive regime share the 
recognition of "signifying practices," Berlin's ideas could 
coincide with Habermas's insofar as participants in the
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"lifeworld" recognize established shared values and norms.
These shared practices could possibly further Habermasian 
ideals of mutual understanding and co-operation within 
societal structures. However, as Berlin reveals in 
"Poststructuralism . . ."we are all composed of "various
competing discourses, conflicted and contradictory scripts, 
that make our consciousness anything but unified, coherent 
and autonomous" (18). Consequently, the competing 
discourses that make up our shared "lifeworlds," possibly 
share fewer values and norms than Habermas envisages, even 
if equal participation in a discourse community is context 
dependent; the writing classroom is one example. Thus, 
overcoming the obstacles put in place by the power 
relations inherent in competing discourses can obstruct 
consensual procedures.
Indeed, as Rhodes points out, the nature of discourse 
is variable. For instance, she furthers Grady and Well's 
notion that discourse communities "each [have their] own 
set of questions—of truth and value, [and] of social roles 
and sincerity" (5-6). Both Berlin and Rhodes, therefore, 
appear to reiterate the postmodern point of view put 
forward by Milovanovic in his discussion of "discourse" 
which highlights the multiplicity of voices, "dialectics of 
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struggle" and "languages of possibility" within a given 
society. He claims that unlike modernism, postmodernism 
does not assume a neutral discourse and the "signified is 
multiaccentual, the site, of diverse struggles" (par. 34). 
Consequently, postmodernists "identify the violence of 
language," and "linguistic repression and alienation are 
the results of historically situated hegemonic discourses" 
(par. 35). It is thus that the variability of discourse and 
the contradictory and conflicted subject pose challenges to 
the attainment of Habermas's utopian, idealized, and 
intersubjective speech situation as it attempts to address 
social change. As Berlin states,
The signifying practices of different groups
. . . compete in forwarding different agendas for
the ways people are to regard their historical 
positions and their modes of responding to them 
and these signifying practices are always a scene 
of battle. (22)
While Habermasian theory attempts to account for and 
transcend these battles with a universalizing theory of 
communication, I take up Rhodes's position that 
postmodernist composition studies' attempt to "fully use 
Habermas [while] at the same time ... we resist the 
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impulse to universalize ourselves or our ways to knowledge" 
(6) is problematic.
In "Ideological Critique in Rhetoric and
Composition," Gary Olson's point of view is similar to 
Berlin's and thus demonstrates the effects of postmodernism 
on composition pedagogy. He claims,
significantly, the kind of pedagogy that Berlin 
and many of us envision is thoroughly rhetorical: 
it is deeply concerned with context, audience, 
and how signifying practices are employed to 
further ideological interests. (85)
(We might recall that Foucault labels this furthering of 
ideological interests, "The Will to Truth"). It is also 
important to note here that Olson confirms composition's 
political involvement; indeed, themes of "ideology," 
"hegemony" and "power"—which are all implicated in 
Foucault's work—dominate much of the language surrounding 
current composition theory.
Meanwhile, one can locate the aforementioned terms—as 
well as radical composition's preoccupation with ideology-- 
in the postmodern realm via Milovanovic's explication of 
"Social Change." As far as the capacity for social change 
is concerned in modernism, an alternative vision of the 
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social is usually tied to the initial logic of the major 
premise of the status quo (par. 66). Thus, the 
oppositionist campaigning for social change, often 
"inadvertently recreates the dominant repressive order" 
(par. 66). On the other hand, postmodernist thought 
pertaining to "social change," "focuses more on nonlinear 
conceptions of historical change"; consequently, "much room 
must be made for the contributions of contingency, irony, 
the spontaneous, and the marginal" (par. 67). Thus, for 
Milovanovic, key concepts for social change from a 
postmodern stance include: premises of action based on 
tolerability, multiplicities of resistance to power, 
genealogy, dialectics of struggle, dialogism, affirmative 
action, and language of possibility (par. 65).
After reviewing Milovanovic's postmodern 
characteristics regarding social change, we can see how 
radical composition's interests overlap with a postmodern 
and Foucauldian sensibility; particularly, in how 
postmodernism approaches issues of diversity, tolerance for 
the incommensurable, antifoundationalism, and constitutive 
theory (par. 8). Furthermore, composition indicates its 
alignment with postmodernism with its attention to 
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multiplicities of resistance to power, and dialectics of 
struggle (par. 65).
My intention in this discussion is to situate the 
Habermas/Foucault debate within the boundaries of 
contemporary composition studies which, in turn, largely 
positions itself against a postmodern landscape. In the 
latter part of this chapter therefore, I visit the work of 
Patricia Roberts, John Trimbur, and Irene Ward to see (a) 
how they have made use of Habermasian theories of 
communicative action in the Public Sphere and that (b), 
when elucidating these theories, they unconsciously fall 
back on Foucauldian principles which address postmodern 
perspectives of problems of ideology, conflict, 
variability, and most importantly, the power relations 
inherent in discourse.
Habermasian Theory in Composition Studies
Before exploring composition's use of Habermas, I 
should briefly recap the "debate." As Samantha Ashenden 
and David Owen posit,
Habermas' objection to Foucault's account [of 
rational critique] is that it identifies being 
context dependent with being context bound, 
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whereas he sees his own activity as deploying 
criteria of rationality which are context 
transcending. (13)
Challenging Habermas, Foucault's critique exhibits 
skepticism toward Habermas's critical reflection with its 
claims to transcendence and universal principles (13).
This skepticism rests on Foucault's concern that Habermas's 
modernist insistence on proposing "the form of critical 
reflection," as opposed to "elaborating a form of critical 
reflection" (1), "tends to freeze certain juridical ways of 
thought and action"(13-14). In short, by positing his rules 
for the ideal speech situation, Habermas imposes standards 
on democratic consensus which, for Foucault, must be 
subjected to genealogical scrutiny. We must not forget that 
both Habermas and Foucault are interested in inclusionary 
emancipatory processes, but as Flyvebjerg suggests,
We [might] ask whether such empowerment is best 
understood and acted, in terms of [modernist] 
consensus or whether [a postmodern examination 
of] conflict is a more suitable frame of 
reference. ("Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for 
Civil Society" 211)
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Bearing this question in mind, we can now look to how 
composition has made use of Habermasian theory. 
Patricia Roberts
As discussed before, Rhodes critiques composition's 
recent use of Habermasian theory, noting the difficulty 
compositionists have encountered with Habermas's writing 
style, translation, and most importantly, with his 
articulation of ideology (2). These ideological 
difficulties have earned him criticism, besides Foucault's, 
as Foss, Foss, and Trapp note:
Many critics fault Habermas's tendency toward 
utopianism, which down plays the particulars of 
political life in favor of abstract and 
generalized notions of rationality and 
emancipation. For example, they criticize 
Habermas for his notion of the ideal speech 
situation—the foundation of his notion of 
rationality. The very idea of the ideal is 
problematic for many scholars because it suggests 
a perfection not possible in language. (252)
I propose this idea of perfection based on abstract notions 
of Enlightenment-wrought rationality has proved problematic 
for compositionists. For example, in her 1991 "Habermas's 
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Varieties of Communicative Actions: Controversy without 
Combat," Patricia Roberts discusses Habermas's notion of 
intersubjective agreement; which (as discussed in the last 
chapter) is the sort of interaction aimed at reaching 
"intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, 
shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one 
another'" (Habermas qtd. in Roberts, par. 20). Placing her 
student writers in this intersubjective realm, Roberts 
imagines a version of the ideal speech situation in order 
to (a) address issues surrounding persuasive writing, (b) 
"orient classes heavily towards class discussion" in order1
to establish audience (par. 35), and (c) determine 
productive ways of collaboration (par. 39).
However, after drawing from Habermasian theory to 
envision a communicatively competent classroom aimed at 
consensus, Roberts notes abruptly that "there are problems 
with Habermas" (par. 41). She writes "The argument is that 
trying to orient students towards consensus will orient 
them towards compromise" (par. 41). Using the example of a 
female student in a class full of male students, Roberts 
highlights the difficulty the female student has in 
convincing male students that "certain apparently harmless 
practices (such as whistling on the street) are actually 
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I
destructive" (par. 42). Roberts concludes that the female 
student is likely to encounter problems reaching her
. I
audience through rational argument because these 
destructive language practices are so embedded in their
I
culture.
In this scenario, it appears Roberts anticipates the
i
postmodern position which "identifies the violence of 
language" and "[the] linguistic repression and alienation
I
[which] are the results of historically situated hegemonic 
discourses" (Milovanovic, pari 35). Consequently, Roberts's 
student might abandon her argument, that is, her
I
justification for alienation in a mostly male environment.
However, Roberts asserts that this version of the outcome 
of this scenario rests on a misunderstanding of Habermasian
Iconsensus, for the goal of her class is to "identify 
difference" within the Habermdsian arena of "reciprocal
!
understanding, shared knowledge and mutual trust" 
(Habermas, qtd. in Roberts, par 43).
Yet, by applying Habermasian theory to a gender issue,
Roberts unconsciously stumbles upon what Flyvbjerg deems a
i
considerable gap in Habermas's work. He maintains that
I
gender politics are possibly1better addressed via
Foucauldian analysis than Habermasian discourse ethics
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I
(225) because "the very idea .of the ideal [that Habermasian
. because itdiscourse ethics imply]
suggests a perfection not possible in language" (Foss,
Foss, and Trapp 252). The imperfections of language, I
!
i
suggest, are especially apparent in gender issues. To
illustrate Flyvbjerg asserts "historically, the very idea
of civil society contains a gender bias and this bias must
be rooted out" (225). He continues, "Progress has been slow
I
Iin developing the theory of communicative rationality in 
ways that would be sensitive to gender and race" (225).
i
Meanwhile, "Habermas has I acknowledged that his
ianalysis does not include gender, ethnicity, class, popular
i
culture" (Flyvbjerg 225) because these differences, within
ithe public sphere--or for our [purposes, the writing 
classroom—can be overcome by'-rational debate (226). That 
is, Habermas believes if we can communicate competently by 
way of rational discourse, we Jean overcome problems of 
difference in areas such as gender and ethnicity. For many 
feminists, however, Habermas's approach is ineffective in
I
combating problems associated;with gender because of the 
deeply rooted nature of gender inequality in civil society.
i
Indeed, Keane tells us that domination and inequality are
I
deeply rooted in the concept of civil society, pointing out 
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that our notion of what civil society is rests on the idea 
of the white "civilized European male" (qtd. in Flyvbjerg 
211). Following this, Keane demonstrates that, 
historically, women have been deemed subordinate. Civil 
society has also transferred its methods of subjugation to 
other groups such as those of' differing ethnicity or sexual 
orientation (211).
In contrast to Habermas's approach, Flyvbjerg 
elaborates that, via genealogical analysis, Foucault 
attends to the postmodern issue of identity politics 
(including gender issues) and, its connections to diversity 
and difference which "is crucial for understanding civil 
society and for acting in it"' (225). As a result, feminists 
have found Foucauldian theory more sympathetic to their 
cause and "have been skeptical about Habermas's confidence 
in abstract rationality" (2250• As we can see, then, in her 
discussion of this particular1 gender issue, Roberts 
highlights postmodern concerns with marginality and lack of 
access rather than modernist ideas that focus on the 
"search for over encompassing1 theories of society and 
social development" (Milovanovic, par. 10) such as 
Habermas's ideal speech situation.
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Even if they have been made aware of Habermasian 
conditions for the ideal speech situation, one wonders how 
far an instructor might get in attempting to persuade a 
room full of socially conditioned men to rethink their 
position on, what Roberts calls, the "inner reality" of 
women (par. 43). Can Habermas's conditions for consensus be 
amended by developing Foucauldian strategies? Flyvbjerg 
suggests "Elaborating genealogies, for instance, of gender 
and race leads to an understanding of how relations of 
domination between men and women, and between different 
people, can be changed" (225). Furthermore, in actuality, 
non-discursive means to promote change have historically 
been more effective: "Feminists . . . get their issues on
the public agenda not primarily by rational consensus but 
through the power struggles and conflicts characteristic of 
activism and social change" (226). Consequently, from my 
perspective, by urging her students "to identify 
differences," on feminist issues, Roberts actually sets the 
stage more appropriately for a Foucauldian approach to this 
subject via a study of conflict and realpolitik, rather 
than for a Habermasian attempt at rational argument. 
However, as I will discuss in Chapter Three, both 
Habermas's and Foucault's approach might be utilized in the 
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politicized classroom in order to compare how their methods 
of critique set the stage for debate in the socio-political 
realm. In the meantime, I turn to John Trimbur's "Consensus 
and Difference in Collaborative Learning" in order to 
explore his use of Habermasian theory and his subsequent 
(yet unvoiced) reliance on Foucault.
John Trimbur
In his 2005, The Function of Theory in Composition 
Studies, Raul Sanchez, following Victor Vitanza, expresses 
concern about compositionists who, through their theories 
of "hope," are attempting to follow Habermas's formula for 
critical rationalism and provide a concept of universal and 
legitimate knowledge based on Habermasian procedures for 
ideal consensus (23). Sanchez accuses these compositionists 
of partaking in a foundationalist "game of knowledge" which 
is projected through a "nostalgia for universals and a 
belief in ideal speech acts" (23). Sanchez's point of view 
is worth mentioning because his stance confronts the anti- 
Foucauldian belief in ideals and is perhaps more 
sympathetic to composition's postmodern position than that 
of the compositionists he accuses. The "belief in ideals" 
that Sanchez is wary of, however, comes across somewhat in 
John Trimbur's "Consensus and Difference in Collaborative 
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Learning;" indeed, Trimbur makes much use of Habermasian 
theory. However, even though Trimbur's article ultimately 
points out his, seemingly postmodern, concern that 
collaborative learning and consensus might squash 
traditionally muted voices while participants in a speech 
situation remain loyal to social and hierarchical 
standards, his use of Habermasian idealism seems at odds 
with his purpose in the essay.
Trimbur makes much of Habermas's position that 
participants in a conversation are not so much motivated by 
rational consensus but by what Habermas terms "success 
orientation" (610). He talks at length about uneven power 
structures in conversation and appeals to compositionists 
to "look at collaborative learning not merely as a process 
of consensus making but, more importantly, as a process of
I
identifying differences and locating these differences in 
relation to each other" (610). Indeed, he demands that as 
we attempt to reach consensus, we should take into account 
a rhetoric of dissensus; that is, the "network of competing 
and contradictory interests" that "pervade writing 
situations" (610). As an example of how students might 
undertake such an endeavor, Trimbur questions literary 
evaluations of what constitutes "good" literature and the 
65
criteria which dictates that some texts are "excluded and 
devalued" (613). He asks why some texts such as Shakespeare 
and Hemingway qualify as literary, while others—Stephen 
King, for example—do not (613). In posing these questions 
to his students, Trimbur requests that they "investigate 
collectively these implicit hierarchies in terms of the 
relations of power that organize them" (613).
In examining these literary hierarchies of power, 
Trimbur asks his student to engage in what Milovanovic 
might deem a postmodern exercise. Specifically, I posit 
that by suggesting his students "begin to critically 
examine the prevailing representation of literature and the 
institutional base on which it rests" (613), Trimbur seems 
to imply that his students paddle about in the postmodern 
point of view that (once again) "linguistic repression and 
alienation are the results of historically situated 
hegemonic discourses" (Milovanovic, par. 35). In doing so, 
Trimbur displays an unconscious reliance on Foucauldian 
thought by asking his students to unearth the differences 
that cause the segregation and resulting canonical 
hierarchies of certain types of reading. In short (and at 
the risk of sounding repetitive), Trimbur requests that his 
students engage in genealogical activity. Certainly, via 
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his use of "dissensus," he seems to advocate the 
Foucauldian approach which attempts to search out the 
unfortunate victims of discursive power struggles or rather 
"[how it happens that] at a given period something could be 
said and something else has never been said" (Foss, Foss, 
and Trapp 347).
Following Flyvbjerg, we might indeed recall that one 
of the fundamental differences between Habermasian and 
Foucauldian thought lies in how they attend to the problem 
of power. As mentioned in my first chapter, Flyvbjerg says 
that in view of the regulations of dominance, Habermas 
approaches the issue of dominance "from a universalistic 
theory of discourse, [while] Foucault seeks out a 
genealogical understanding of power relations in specific 
contexts" (223). In short, Flyvbjerg accuses Habermas of 
not paying enough attention to power relationships in 
discourse. Consequently, Trimbur seems to be echoing 
Foucault when, later in his article, he states:
Unlike Habermas ... I do not believe removing 
relations of domination and systematic 
distortion, whether ideological or neurotic, from 
the conversation is likely to establish the
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conditions in which consensus will express a 
rational will and permit what all can want. (615) 
Once again, Habermas does not attend to the problem of 
power because he believes rational discourse can overcome 
relations of dominance. Foucault, on the other hand, "sees 
the examination of resistance and struggle [as] the most 
solid basis for the practice of freedom" (Flyvbjerg 223). 
As we might assume from the excerpt above, Trimbur appears 
to be endorsing Foucault, thus confirming his position in 
the postmodern realm. The postmodern view, however, is 
ultimately at odds with the Habermasian approach he 
employs.
As I stated earlier, Trimbur makes use of Habermas's 
position that rational consensus is hindered by 
participants' orientation towards success within a speech 
situation. Simply put, this.means that rational discussion 
takes a back seat to those who insist on proving a point of 
view. To reduce success orientation in consensual debate— 
while proposing that his students study the power relations 
embedded in literary discourses—Trimbur suggests that 
Habermas's ideal speech situation be posed as a "deferred 
and utopian" (614) idea of consensus. More specifically, it 
should be used as a critical measure from which students 
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can imagine consensus—and thus be relieved of the pressure 
to attain it--as "a necessary fiction of reciprocity and 
mutual recognition, the dream of conversation as perfect 
dialogue" (612). Simply put, Trimbur states that the ideal 
speech situation can never be achieved. Rather like Plato's 
place of ideal forms, Habermasian consensus (symmetrical, 
non-coercive rationality) for Trimbur, is never attainable 
but always something to strive for.
From a postmodern perspective, Trimbur's displaced 
view of consensus as an unreachable ideal seems somewhat 
problematic. For it echoes the foundationalism Sanchez 
speaks of at the beginning of this section, with its 
nostalgia for ideals. On the one hand, Trimbur calls for a 
postmodern examination of the rhetoric of dissensus which 
essentially asks students to dissect knowledge production. 
Yet, on the other, he asks his students to imagine a 
"utopian representation of consensus [which] offers 
students a powerful critical instrument to interrogate the 
conversation" (612); this imagined utopia implies the 
"real" possibility of an "ideal" knowledge, however 
unreachable. Thus, Trimbur sends a mixed message for he 
appears caught between two paradigms. His latter request 
seems to advance the modernist stance that it is possible 
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to imagine an over-arching theory of discourse/knowledge; 
in this case, the ideal speech situation. Yet, as we might 
again recall from Milovanovic, a postmodernist point of 
view assumes "that the search for an overall, all- 
encompassing totalizing theory is an illusory exercise" 
(par. 13). This corresponds with the Foucauldian point of 
view that the quest for ideals is potentially dangerous. 
For, recalling Flyvbjerg's comments from Chapter One, we 
should be wary of ideals "given the historical experience 
that few things have produced more suffering among humans 
than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of 
good" (222).
The contradiction in Trimbur's article, it seems, 
places us firmly within the territory of the 
Habermas/Foucault "debate." On the one hand, Trimbur's 
suggestion that.students imagine a transcendent version of 
the ideal speech situation offers them a critical measure 
from which they can examine the possibility of dominance in 
the process of consensus. Yet, from a Foucauldian point of 
view, Trimbur has resorted to imagining the unimaginable. 
For, as he hovers above abstract ground positing fictive 
ideals, he implies there is a definitive approach to 
critical reflection. For Foucault, posing fictive ideals is 
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a dangerous practice, and he might ask Trimbur what 
constitutes the perfect and ideal speech situation; that 
is, how might it manifest itself (even if it is 
unattainable) according to what discursive formation?
Consequently, Trimbur's contradiction—in his utopian 
driven, yet, postmodern writing classroom—seems to bring 
us back to Flyvbjerg's question concerning civil democracy, 
which we can thus extend to a politicized writing 
classroom; that is, should we analyze ideological dominance 
and hegemonic practices via practical examinations of 
conflict in historical contexts (or what Trimbur terms 
"dissensus"), or, should we address societal/political 
change by recommending Habermasian criteria that 
establishes standards (however utopian) for democratic 
debate? I will explore this question in depth in Chapter 
Three by focusing on the usefulness of a comparative 
analysis of the Habermas/Foucault debate in the politicized 
classroom; in particular, I find, in order to locate a 
point of complementarity between the two philosophers, the 
idea of Habermas's ideal speech situation should, perhaps, 
be dropped. For now, however, I turn to my third 
compositionist, Irene Ward, who also makes use of 
Habermasian theories of participation in the public sphere.
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Irene Ward
In "How Democratic can we Get: The Internet, the 
Public Sphere, and Public Discourse," Ward looks to how 
Habermas's theory of the public sphere can be used "as a 
lens through which to query the claims that the Internet 
and its discursive practices will serve as a transformative 
tool that will benefit democratic politics" (366).
Democratic debate in the Internet version of Habermas's 
public sphere would, of course, follow his guidelines for 
rational democratic practice:
It would have to offer a public space or arena
for people to debate issues in order to influence 
civil society and the state: moreover, the public 
discourse formed in response to such debate will 
have been "legitimized" by the scrutiny and 
challenge of other citizens and stakeholders in 
the debate. (367)
If we recall from my first chapter, debate in the public 
sphere guarantees "every citizen the right of access to 
discussion 'in the public sphere by virtue of the abstract 
right of humanness" (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 239). Thus, 
"legitimized" public discourse ensures that no one is
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excluded, and rational debate, which strives for 
communicative competence, is the medium for conversation.
However, within the first few paragraphs of her 
discussion, Ward succumbs to the Foucauldian problem of 
historical difference. She writes,
Although the internet and the bourgeois public 
sphere do seem similar in many ways and seem to 
point to the Internet's potential to function as 
a form of public sphere, other factors such as 
. . . differing historical circumstances also
seem to undercut that potential. (366)
As far as our current "historical" position is concerned, 
circumstances look initially promising in terms of access 
to the cyber sphere. For, the Internet offers anonymity to 
all that want to publish on it (369). For example, Ward 
points out that the identity of writers on the net is 
"obscured and often hidden" (369) as they hide behind' 
pseudonyms and/or establish "false markers of age, gender, 
ethnicity, and so on" (369). However, while this serves to 
level the playing field on the net as far as social 
hierarchies are concerned, it does little to relieve the 
social/ethnic/gender-related tensions that occur in face to 
face situations. Furthermore, as Ward points out, this 
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anonymity "can also lead to a great deal of mistrust 
online" (370).
Like Roberts and Trimbur before her, Ward focuses on 
problems of "difference" in her discussion of communication 
in the public sphere. As I have established previously, 
these differences, which are recognized as set against a 
particular historical landscape and dictated by those in 
power, look suspiciously like Foucauldian concerns. As 
Ward's article indicates, while Habermas sets the stage for 
public debate, he glosses over "difference" by asserting 
that that the "proper" use of rationality can be used to 
overcome systems of domination. Yet, in his discussion of 
Ward's use of Habermas, Christian Weisser points out that 
"Habermas fails to acknowledge that . . . equality [in the
public sphere] has historically been limited to white, 
male, propertied, citizens" (50). It is quite possible to 
conclude, therefore,' that for Habermas, the "proper use of 
rationality" is made manifest according to the standards of 
this group.
What, we should ask, constitutes "equality" for a 
particular group of people in any given circumstance? As 
far as the Internet is concerned, for Ward, if and when the 
Internet becomes commodified, democratic practice within it 
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might be limited only to those who can afford the 
technology. She states:
Needless to say, the same social and economic 
forces and institutions--race, class, and gender 
—that allow for unequal access to education in 
this country will operate to make the issue of 
access a severe limitation to the ultimate 
democratic potential of the internet. (375) 
Unfortunately, the fate of inclusion within this particular 
public sphere lies in participants' attempts to "desist 
from strategic action" (Flyvbjerg 213). Yet historically, 
as Ward indicates, the drive for economic success tends to 
encourage strategic action within the public sphere.
Conclusion
In each of my responses to composition's use of 
Habermas, I am drawn back to Flyvbjerg's questions 
regarding the Habermas/Foucault debate and its implications 
for ideological and emancipatory change in civil society. 
That is, do we face head on the problems of exclusion, 
difference, diversity and the politics of identity? (211). 
Or, do we look to ethical consensus to set universal 
standards for emancipatory behaviour? So far, it seems 
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composition's point of view addresses the former as it 
tries to amend Habermasian theories with those of Foucault. 
However, composition's use of Habermas and its subsequent, 
yet unvoiced, reliance on Foucault brings me to the 
conclusion that, following Flyvbjerg, a comparison of "the 
discourse ethics of Habermas with the power analytics and 
ethics of Foucault" (210) would provide a useful framework 
from which to understand and bring about social change. 
Indeed, a fully articulated look at the debate--that is, a 
comparison of the two methods of critique--might inform the 
politicized writing class about how "truth" is determined, 
and how reason is awarded "reasonable" status.
Following this, Chapter Three will see what use 
composition might make of the Habermas/Foucault debate 
within politicized writing studies. In addition, it will 
explore the possibility of reconciliation between the two 
philosophers which might offer us new ways to imagine our 
classrooms as "public spheres." Finally, I will look to 
Peter Rule's explanation of "dialogic space" in the South 
African "Tuition Project" and to Patricia Bizzell's 
discussion of rational debate in medieval Spain to gain a 
sense of how the Habermas/Foucault debate offers us a 
76
framework from which we can identify "rationalities" at 
work within particular historical circumstances.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE HABERMAS/FOUCAULT DEBATE IN
THE WRITING CLASSROOM
In this chapter, I will discuss further the term 
"radical composition" and what it entails in the current 
composition climate. Taken together, the Habermasian and 
Foucauldian theories I discuss offer radical composition 
valuable insights into methods of critique based on Bernd 
Stahl's assumption that "both aim to be critical in order 
to improve human circumstances" (4434). Considering radical 
composition's preoccupation with the ideologies embedded in 
discourses, and public writing's desire to initiate social 
change in some form or another, the Habermas/Foucault 
debate might subsequently inform a politicized classroom. 
That is, an articulation of the debate can provide a 
specific theoretical background from which to examine 
public writing while presenting to students the views that 
characterize modern (and Habermasian) thought, as well as 
those that constitute postmodern (and Foucauldian) thought. 
Following this, an elucidation of the debate offers 
students the critical stimulus to examine social issues 
without subjecting them to an instructor's political 
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stance; indeed, overtly politicizing the classroom has been 
a controversial issue in recent composition history. 
Consequently, students in a politicized writing space, 
informed by the Habermas/Foucault debate, might make up 
their own minds on social issues.
In order to demonstrate how the Habermas/Foucault 
debate might inform students' critical inquiry into the 
historical, cultural, and political influences on 
discourses, I will turn to Peter Rule's explanation of the 
"Tuition Project" in South Africa. A close look at this 
project reveals how "the playing field" for rational debate 
and learning is fraught with ideological struggle. 
Ideological struggle and its influence on rationality are 
also revealed in Patricia Bizzell's examination of the 1263 
disputation at Barcelona in medieval Spain. Although this 
particular debate occurred centuries ago, Bizzell's 
assessment offers us a Foucauldian-like cautionary tale as 
to the nature of rationality in specific historical 
contexts.
79
The Habermas/Foucault Debate 
in Radical Composition
Set within the postmodern paradigm, radical 
composition concerns itself with ways in which language 
perpetuates dominant ideology-as we have seen from the 
compositionists under discussion. In Moving beyond Academic 
Discourses . . . Weisser claims that "radical theories in 
composition studies . . . have recently begun to conceive
of the public sphere as ... a useful metaphor for how we 
might envision writing classrooms" (xiii). Thus, with its 
interest in’ how ideology is perpetuated, radical 
composition emphasizes that students recognize "that public 
discourse is not merely the 'clear' articulation of facts" 
(Weisser 113). Instead, it asks students to "be much more 
critical in their interpretation of public discourse" 
(Weisser 113). Accordingly, the writing-classroom-as- 
public-sphere can encourage "student writing to have real 
political and social ramifications" (57).
Weisser specifies how Habermas's theory of the public 
sphere, with its focus on emancipatory discourses in the 
form of the ideal speech situation, has sparked interest in 
the field of radical composition. Yet, as Weisser, Roberts 
et al, and numerous other critics have stated, Habermas's 
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theories are problematic. Interestingly, (as I have 
shown), the problems compositionists foresee in Habermas's 
work are indeed those that Foucault addresses in the 
debate: Habermas's approaches to "difference", power, and 
ideology. As Weisser states, (and as I explored in Chapter 
Two,) "Habermas . . . fails to fully recognize the degree 
to which ideology shapes public discourse, and [his] 
investigations are less thorough as a result" (96). As 
Habermasian discourse theory fails to account fully for the 
problems of power and ideology in the public sphere, 
Foucault's power analytics can be viewed as a logical 
amendment to the gaps postmodern compositionists stumble 
upon in Habermasian scholarship. A Foucauldian scrutiny of 
ideology might thus enhance Habermasian approaches to 
discourse in the public sphere considering "ideology is one 
of the most central aspects of current composition theory" 
(Weisser 96).
The Problem of Politics in the Classroom
Introducing the Habermas/Foucault debate into a 
politicized writing classroom might overcome some of the 
controversy surrounding radical composition. Despite 
Weisser's enthusiastic endorsement of radical composition, 
the idea of the writing classroom as a politicized public 
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space has been a subject for debate for a number of years; 
in particular, Linda Brodkey's 1990 imbroglio at UT Austin 
comes to mind.
As Karen Welch relates in "Social Issues in First Year 
College Writing," in.1989, Brodkey was on the English 
committee that designed a writing course asking students to 
critically address issues of difference in anti­
discrimination lawsuits (par. 5). Yet, as Welch continues, 
"other department faculty and some administrators strongly 
resisted this proposed course as one that they felt 
constituted a liberal political agenda" (par. 5). The 
controversy at UT Texas soon garnered national attention, 
sparking a controversy in composition and the media "that 
continues today about the expediency of including social 
and political issues in first-year college writing courses" 
(par. 5). Certainly, some compositionists feel that 
political issues have no business in the writing classroom.
More recently, the contentious firing of two teaching 
assistants from the University of California, San Diego's, 
"Dimensions of Culture" writing sequence demonstrates that 
politicizing the writing classroom is still a controversial 
issue. According to Elizabeth Redden, this program was 
originally designed to "challenge hegemonic assumptions 
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about race, class, gender, and sexuality" (par. 3). Yet, 
the sequence became a source of controversy because the 
TA's felt the courses involved had succumbed to "a form of 
uncritical patriotic education" (par.3). On the other hand, 
the course administrator claimed the program was leaning 
towards "political indoctrination" (par.4).
The UCSD incident highlights a typical criticism of 
the politicized, and radical, composition classroom. In 
their comprehensive bibliography of radical composition, 
Bill Thelin and Theresa Grettano cite Maxine Hairston's 
1992 critique, "Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing" 
(2). Hairston argues against what she sees as a 
"problematic trend" (2) in composition: the teaching of 
politically complex issues to reveal the ideological 
processes embedded in discourses. The dilemma lies in the 
potential indoctrination of students to an instructor's 
political stance; for Hairston, this is particularly 
worrying as writing instructors are not generally 
specialists in the field of political theory. Hairston 
further■argues that as an instructor is a figure of 
authority, his/her political perspective can "stifle or 
silence students' voices through intimidation" (2).
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Stanley Fish issues further protest against 
politicized teaching in the writing classroom. Thelin and 
Grettano restate Fish's opinion in his 2003, "Save the 
World on Your Own Time." Responding to student protests 
against New School University president's opinion of US 
policy in Iraq, Fish insists that universities should 
remain neutral in politics (2). By taking a stance on 
political issues, Fish claims universities "damage academic 
virtue, which he defines as teaching, research and 
publishing about . . . academic matters" (2). For Fish,
political indoctrination is not the business of the 
university.
Instructors who attempt to impose political beliefs on 
their students contradict and counter the critical 
usefulness of radical composition. It is my belief, 
however, that Fish et al are mistaken in downplaying its 
importance. Since radical composition concerns itself with 
how language practices perpetuate and maintain ideology, it 
offers students the chance to sharpen their critical 
awareness of the world around them. Radical compositionists 
need not indoctrinate students into a specific political 
realm but help them develop an awareness of the diversity 
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of social, cultural, and political worldviews and the power 
structures embedded in them.
I suggest, therefore, that a study of the 
Habermas/Foucault debate might facilitate this process. As 
I indicated at the beginning of this thesis and this 
chapter, following Flyvebjerg, a "comparative analysis of 
the central ideas of Habermas and Foucault as they pertain 
to the question of democracy and civil society" (210) could 
present students with the occasion to explore differing 
methods of critique in a politicized classroom. Rather than 
focusing on a particular political issue, students might be 
able to estimate the usefulness of Habermasian and/or 
Foucauldian theories of discourse and how they relate to 
issues in the public sphere. Perhaps, they might then 
relate these ideas to social issues of their own choosing 
in order to understand and bring about democratic social 
change.
Can Habermas and Foucault be Reconciled?
If the Habermas/Foucault debate offers the politicized 
writing classroom an alternative (and perhaps philosophical 
approach) to the study of ideology and its effects on text 
and discourse, we might then ask if the two philosophers 
can be reconciled.
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In his article, "Whose Discourse? A Comparison of
Habermas and Foucault," Stahl compares the discourse 
theories of both and argues that the "the most important 
correspondence between Habermas and Foucault can thus be 
said to be their critical approach, their hope to use their 
work to improve the social world" (4334). However, beyond 
their critical intentions pertaining to social change, 
Stahl points to one view that asserts Habermasian and 
Foucauldian theory are so fundamentally different, the best 
we might hope for is to "chose a position and avoid the 
mistake of mixing up the two" (4334). In the composition 
classroom, this choice might be left entirely up to the 
students once they have established a knowledge of both 
Habermasian and Foucauldian methods of critique. For 
instance, perhaps a Habermasian approach to engagement in 
the public sphere based on his ideas of communicative 
competence and the establishment of rules for debate might 
appease participants' sense of fairness and inclusion.
Certainly, the right to participate in the public sphere by 
virtue of one's humanness seems the very epitome of 
democracy.
However, other students might feel that the playing 
field for debate and discussion of social issues in the 
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public sphere is not quite level enough to apply Habermas's 
rules for engagement. They could base this evaluation on 
long perpetuated ideological imbalances in issues such as 
race, gender, sexual orientation and so on. These students 
could adopt a Foucauldian approach in their investigations 
into social issues by conducting their own genealogical 
explorations into how certain ideological values and 
beliefs are perpetuated. They could, for instance, explore 
why some issues are taboo in the public sphere and why 
others are considered palatable for public discussion by 
following Foucauldian interest in how "the past concerns 
how we have become in the present" (Ashenden and Owen 13). 
Certainly, our notions of what is considered appropriate 
for public attention are still, as Weisser states, 
"ambiguous" (109).
Weisser, rightly, makes much of the often un-level 
nature of a public sphere's playing field based on ideas of 
what are considered "public" social issues and what are 
deemed "private" (109). To illustrate, Weisser, citing 
Nancy Fraser, elaborates:
The issue of domestic violence was, until quite 
recently, considered to be a private matter 
between what was assumed to be a fairly small 
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number of heterosexual couples. Feminists were 
in the minority in thinking that "domestic 
violence against women was a matter of common 
concern and thus a legitimate topic of public 
discourse." (qtd. in Weisser 109)
Following Fraser, Weisser asserts that the "the labeling of 
some interests as 'public' and others as 'private' is an 
ideological'mystification" (109) determined by those in 
power who "get to decide what is a public issue and what is 
not" (109). As I have shown, the matter of power and who 
wields has largely been a Foucauldian concern.
Weisser points out that notions of what is "private" 
and what is deemed appropriate for discussion or debate in 
the public sphere might stifle students who choose to 
express their ideas about issues that are not considered 
palatable by "large segments of the population" (108). For 
instance, students might not, in the current ideological' 
climate, feel comfortable discussing issues concerning 
"sexual orientation, spousal and acquaintance abuse, and 
other matters of domestic or personal life" (109). Yet, 
Weisser insists that teachers in a classroom that focuses 
on public writing have a "responsibility to enable students 
to discover and write about all of the issues that affect 
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their lives" (109). Encouraging students to scrutinize 
dominant ideologies would facilitate thi$ process of 
enablement. However, as stated earlier, encouraging 
critical awareness in a politicized classroom need not be 
reduced to an exercise in political indoctrination. The 
possibility of indoctrination would be avoided by 
encouraging students to decide for themselves exactly what 
social or political issues they wish to write about.
Despite his point that one might take either a
Habermasian or Foucauldian approach to democratic 
practices—with the attitude that the two approaches are 
incommensurable—Stahl posits that their emancipatory 
intentions are actually enough to consider ways in which 
their ideas can be viewed as complementary (4334). 
Subsequently, he suggests that Foucault's approach—namely, 
a genealogical one—might amend Habermasian discourse 
ethics. In short, Habermasian and Foucauldian theory can be 
used together.
If we recall Habermas's insistence on equal 
participation in the sphere and the criticism his ideas 
have generated, we might remember that utopian-like 
consensus by way of an ideal speech situation is improbable 
due to power dynamics in discourse. Stahl thus suggests 
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that Foucauldian intervention might be useful because "it 
sharpens awareness of the non-discursive elements of 
discourse" (4334). Stahl asserts that via a "genealogy of 
discourses and [the] power constellations that shape them," 
(4334) participants in the public sphere can gain insight 
into "understanding and contextualizing validity claims" 
(4334). Keeping in mind my above discussion of what is 
deemed public concern in the public sphere and what is 
considered private, Stahl suggests that a Foucauldian 
approach to discourse in the public sphere can "expose 
hidden validity claims that have been taken for granted but 
that may not be tenable when seen in broad daylight" 
(4334) .
By following Stahl's suggestion that we use genealogy 
to rout out difference, conflict, and hidden ideological 
agendas, we can assume that Foucault's approach foreshadows 
that of Roberts, Trimbur, and Ward—particularly, as far as 
Trimbur's rhetoric of dissensus is concerned. Unlike 
Trimbur, however, we can avoid being stuck between dueling 
modern and postmodern paradigms if we make a substantial 
amendment to Habermas's vision of consensus in the public 
sphere.
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If we take into consideration Trimbur's suggestion 
that his students imagine a Habermasian and utopian arena 
of perfect consensus, we might then look to Michael Calvin 
McGee and John R. Lyne who in fact reject Habermas's ideal 
speech situation. They claim that this way of thinking 
invites the "nightmare" world of Plato, whereby speech "can 
be depersonalized" (397). They maintain the anti- 
Habermasian position that "Habermas . . . envisions a kind
of rhetoric that has never existed and in probability 
cannot exist" (397). This "kind of rhetoric" could only 
occur if "the ideal speech situation were skillfully 
fabricated" (397) and "some standard [were] set, against 
which the shortcoming of a real rhetorical interaction 
could be assessed" (397). In short, debate would be 
contrived and thus potentially standardized in ways that 
could merely serve to reenact the status quo. McGee and 
Lyne utterly reject this approach, arguing that in such "an 
airy and bloodless world . . . arguments without attitude
would achieve nothing" (397). With their attitude, McGee 
and Lyne echo Foucault's position that grand abstractions 
(such as the ideal speech situation) must be scrutinized. 
How then might Foucault and Habermas be reconciled if we 
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continue to imagine Habermas's notion of universal speech 
structures which anticipates emancipatory ideals?
In response to this question, John Brocklesby and 
Stephen Cummings cite Flood and Jackson's argument that if 
Habermas and Foucault are ultimately to be compatible, "the 
Habermasian idea that 'truth' comes about from the force of 
a better argument emanating from debate in a 'true' speech 
situation is dropped" (752). In short, envisioning the 
ideal speech situation as perfect consensus is completely 
discarded. Along with Plato's world of ideal forms, 
Habermas's ideal speech situation is rejected as a response 
to "the Foucauldian idea that no position can ever be 
absolutely right, nor can we ever remove the distortions in 
peoples' perceptions bought about through power relations" 
(752).
While some might think that the rejection of ideals 
leaves us with no means by which to measure ethical 
behaviour, Brocklesby and Cummings instead claim that a 
combination of Habermasian and Foucauldian theory actually 
furthers emancipatory thinking. Like Stahl, they maintain 
that, for Habermas and Foucault, emancipation is on "both 
their 'agendas'" (753). Amending Habermas with Foucauldian 
thought, however, ultimately "provides the tools, maps, and 
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courage for people in local situations to emancipate their 
thinking" (753). According to Brocklesby and Cummings, this 
enables an awareness of power and the restrictions ideology 
places on the introduction of radical, or innovative, ideas 
into the public sphere. In the politicized writing 
classroom, therefore, and buoyed by Foucauldian thought, 
students might feel freer to put forward ideas that 
challenge the status quo, and thus enjoy the freedom to 
invent in ways that stimulate the growth of new ideas.
The Habermas/Foucault Debate:
A Lens to Realpolitik
The Tuition Project
What are the implications of the Habermas/Foucault 
debate (and what we can learn from it) in a real world 
situation? We can get an idea of how the debate offers us a 
lens through which we might take a look at real world 
situations by way of Rule's account of "The Tuition 
Project" in South Africa.
In "Dialogic Spaces: Adult Education Projects and i 
Social Engagement," Rule addresses the nature of a 
discourse community in a specific public sphere--in this 
case, a dialogic space set against a backdrop of extreme 
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violence: the 1976 Soweto uprising in South Africa (232).
In this space, Rule evokes Habermas's ideal speech 
situation but claims'—in a similar manner to Roberts et al 
—that whereas Habermas's use of dialogue/communication 
"implies a utopian state of being," he "[prefers] to see it 
as a process that involves tension and growth; an unfolding 
of selves within particular contexts" (326).
Rule demonstrates his experience of a public sphere
set against the backdrop of political turmoil in his 
description of "The Tuition Project." The Tuition Project, 
established during the Soweto Uprising, was designed to 
educate disadvantaged young adults. Rule writes, "the 
students were often politicized and at the forefront of the 
struggle against apartheid education" (327). Indeed, 
apartheid suppressed all forms of' dialogue, not only 
between blacks and whites, but between employers and 
employees, rich and poor (329). The Tuition Project, 
however,
created an environment in which black and white 
people could relate to each other in new ways- 
teachers and learners within a learning space. 
This encounter challenged the ways ... in which 
they typically thought about each other.
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Responses from Tuition Project students in this 
regard suggest that not only racial attitudes, 
but those associated with class underwent 
transformation. (328)
In order for the Project to function, participants had to 
agree to conditions to ensure the dialogic space was 
maintained. The conditions were articulated in Habermasian 
tones; they included:
A basis of trust (there can be no dialogue 
without trust); an attitude of openness towards 
learning from one another; a physical space where 
participants could meet in relative safety; a 
project ethos that encourages participants to 
express themselves; and a commitment to solving 
problems through meeting, discussion, reflection 
and consensus rather than coercion. (330) 
Importantly, however, Rule points out that as well as 
forging a safe realm, free from coercion, participants in 
the Tuition project studied the power relations inherent 
within their particular political context. The project 
engaged different discourses, consisting of educators and 
committee members—both black and white—and students and 
parents from "different regions, social backgrounds, and 
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political orientations" (Rule 331). As a result of these 
varied discourses, and the troubled setting of the project, 
tensions ran extremely high as participants jostled to be 
heard and power hierarchies were disrupted. Thus, because 
of "educational disruption, political repression, popular 
resistance, family breakdown, [and] violence in many forms, 
the dialogue was often one of conflict and contestation" 
(Rule 331) .
To complicate matters further, the internal struggles 
within the Tuition- Project were juxtaposed against 
dialogues, characteristic of political chaos, taking place 
outside the project:
The noise from anti-dialogic forms of interaction 
. . . orders, demands, racist insults,
propaganda, stones, bullets, burning tyres, 
interrogation and torture-impinged on the project 
dialogue. (331)
Typically, these discourses further exacerbated the 
tensions inside the project. So, although Habermasian rules 
of engagement attempted to determine the arena for 
dialogue, "the dialogue was not without conflict, struggle, 
or pain" and adverse power relationships—"informed by 
apartheid stereotypes of white and black" (328)—were ever 
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present (330). In an effort to address these conflicts, 
Tuition Project educators conducted Foucauldian-like 
examinations of power and struggle so as to explicitly 
reveal the vast social differences within the Tuition 
Project's public sphere. To facilitate social awareness, 
these were "articulated and elaborated within the process 
of dialogue" (330).
What Rule's project reveals is that the undeniable 
facets of competing subjectivities in a politically charged 
situation make envisioning the ideal speech situation 
almost impossible. For, as Foucault might point out, it is 
impossible to remove ourselves from the power struggles 
that take place within specific historical contexts. In 
addition, in a politically unstable environment, one 
person's idea of rational debate might be very different 
from another's. The best we might hope for then is to 
engage in a dialogue committed to exposing and examining 
abuses of power-perhaps by way of Foucauldian genealogy- 
rather than one committed to adhering to ideals.
Patricia Bizzell's Cautionary Tale
Like Rule, Bizzell tackles an instance in history 
where the public sphere was a site of conflicting and 
competing discourses. Her retelling of the 1263 Barcelona
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debate between Jewish sage Nahmanides and Christian convert
Friar Paul Christian extends a cautionary tale to 
composition teachers who present public debate as if 
"occurs on a rhetorically level playing field" (12). Like 
Rule's project, Bizzell shows us some discursive spaces are 
never quite as level as we might imagine, and she rejects 
the outcome of debates as "emerging from [a] kind of 
idealized debate situation" (13). She also reveals that 
what constitutes "rationality" within a specific historical 
terrain is sometimes not rational at all—at least not in 
Habermasian terms. She thus follows Foucault's advice that 
rationality, at any point in history, must be subjected to 
genealogical scrutiny. This is implied in her in-depth 
study of the political and cultural landscape surrounding 
the 1263 debate.
Bizzell writes "from the very early days of 
Christianity, the new faith defined itself against Judaism" 
(15) and in the twelfth century "there was a new urgency to 
either persuade Jews to convert or drive them out" (16). 
Why? Because a renewed interest in classical thought 
intrigued Europe as new knowledge flooded in by way of the 
crusades and contact with Muslim culture (16) and "under 
[this] influence, thinkers elevated reason as the supreme 
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natural attribute" (16). Consequently, religious beliefs 
were constantly under scrutiny. As the dominant faith, 
therefore, Christianity became "hyper-sensitive" (18) to 
the rational analysis of their faith; thus, rationality had 
to be "Christianized" (18). The target of Christian 
rational persuasion was the Jews for they had been raising, 
for some time, the same questions "about Christian 
rationality that were now being raised by Christian 
thinkers' examination of Christian beliefs" (16). As the 
group in power, Christians needed to defend their faith 
against Jewish scrutiny of the Bible; they needed to prove, 
by "rational" means, that their version of the Bible was 
the "right" one for "there was a new desire for uniformity 
in the faith community" (16). Bizzell cites several 
examples of Christian "rationality" during this period. For 
instance, to justify the miracle of Mary's virgin 
conception, Christian thinkers explained "that Mary 
remained virginal just as a glass is not broken when the 
sun shines through it" (17).
Christians called for a public debate with Jewish 
leaders because rather than use death threats against the 
Jews to make them convert, the new interest in classical 
reason prompted Christian eagerness to "persuade them"
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(19 emphasis in original). The debate was "ardently 
supported" (20) by the Christian King of Spain, James of 
Aragon; however, as we might suspect, there were several 
conditions stipulated as to how the debate would proceed. 
As Bizzell states, "the debate was not an open intellectual 
engagement between two equal opponents operating under the 
same rules" (20); certainly, Jewish participation in such 
an event was decidedly dangerous and any hope of "winning" 
was out of the question (15). The rules were thus 
negotiated that "the Dominicans who caused the disputation 
to happen also determined what questions would be 
addressed" (20) and the Christian interlocutor, Friar Paul, 
"always spoke first and posed questions to Nahmanides whose 
responses were restricted to answering those questions 
only" (21).
Briefly, therefore, the Christians set out to, 
prove from Jewish sources that the Messiah had 
already come, that he was both human and divine, 
and that he had suffered and died to save 
humankind from sin: none of these points is 
connected specifically with Jesus in rabbinic 
literature, but Paul believed that if he could 
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prove all three, Nahmanides would have to admit 
that only Jesus fulfilled them all. (21)
As we can see, as a result of Christian ideas of what 
constituted rationality, the odds were stacked against 
Nahmanides from the- start. Yet, as Bizzell points out in 
her lengthy description of the details of the debate—too 
vast in its scope to relate here—Nahmanides argued his 
case admirably; he was later awarded a cash prize and the 
admiration of the King. However, he did little fo improve
the Jewish lot; for the Christians failed to abandon their
"new missionizing" rhetoric based on their version of 
rationality, but rather "continued to refine and employ it" 
(27) .
My point here is not to expound upon the details of 
the 1263 Disputation, but to emphasize that Bizzell's 
purpose, like my own, stresses that interpretations of what 
is "rational" appear to change throughout the ages. 
Accordingly, Bizzell asks "in what sense does the Barcelona 
disputation provide composition instructors with a 
cautionary tale?" (28). Answering in Foucauldian tones, she 
states "[it] can be considered a cautionary tale about the 
limits of rationality" (28). Bizzell's essay is thus a 
cautionary tale about what constitutes "truth;" whose
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truths are being adhered to and whose are being muted. It 
provides us with a solid example of how reason and 
rationality, even in Habermasian tones, must be scrutinized 
from a Foucauldian perspective to ensure that muted truths 
get a fair hearing on what is not always a level playing 
field.
A Final Thought
In a politicized composition classroom--specifically, 
one that concerns itself with writing, debate, and 
democratic practice in the public sphere--a study of the 
Habermas/Foucault debate can reveal that participants will 
always have ideological hurdles to overcome, even when the 
best intentions attempt to ensure equal participation for 
all. As Flyvbjerg states, in matters of public and civil
!
society, the Habermas/Foucault debate indicates the tension 
"between the normative and the real, between what should be 
done and what is actually done" (210). Habermas's discourse 
ethics might seem like the solution to oppressive practices 
in our current discursive formation, but as Foucault shows 
us, power dynamics are inescapable and ever-present. Thus, 
as Habermasian theory takes a constitutional route, (that 
is, it lays down conditions for ideal participation in the 
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public sphere), it should still be scrutinized because 
"inequality and domination has been built into the concept 
of civil society from the start" (211).
As we have seen from Bizzell in particular, (although 
neither Rule or Bizzell refer explicitly to the 
Habermas/Foucault debate), discourse in the public sphere 
that aims to be rational and reflect the "truth" can be 
distorted by historical/contextual forces. These forces 
provoke the problems associated with the placement of 
conflicting discourses in the public sphere, which, in 
turn, demonstrates Weisser's (and Foucault's) point of view 
that the playing field for debate is perhaps never quite 
level enough to envision Habermas's ideal speech situation. 
We might then, taking Brocklesby and Cummings's advice, 
leave Habermas's perfect concept of the ideal speech 
situation to gather dust in Plato's realm of ideal forms.
Without upholding the ideal speech situation as the 
ideal "truth", we could, however, utilize Habermas's rules 
for engagement in the public sphere (that is, the freedom 
to express one's opinion in a place of safety and, at 
least, attempted trust) to emphasize the need for a non- 
coercive environment. Then, when power struggles—or those 
"private" issues that remain muted by hegemonic practice— 
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crop up, we might engage in explicitly-stated Foucauldian, 
genealogical activity to determine the roots of the 
struggle, or "private-ness" of the issue, perhaps finding 
that these roots are themselves the products of conflict.
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